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As a student of international relations, naval and
military science, and overall strategy formulation, the
writer is deeply interested in the nature of the environment
in which all of these are conducted. Many people are con-
vinced that this environment is considerably different from
the one that developed following World War II. They feel
that world affairs and strategic matters must be analyzed in
light of a "new balance"; a nuclear stalemate that has re-
sulted in manifest relaxations of cold war tensions. This
writer subscribes to this belief.
The following project was undertaken in an attempt to
more clearly understand the degree of relevance that must be
attached to traditional force-forms and strategic planning
in a period of stalemate and accommodation. Admittedly, the
problem was approached with preconceived ideas, and yet a
sincere, if not always successful, effort was made to avoid
a narrow evaluation of concepts.
This thesis does not necessarily constitute an exer-
cise in research technique, although the standard procedures
were utilized where it became necessary or advisable to sub-
stantiate various positions; but rather, this is an exercise
in distillation and selectivity; an exercise in "theory
evaluation." As such, it is an essay. Chapter titles are
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self-explanatory and tend to indicate the logical develop-
ment of the study, and the total result is not as important
as the true value that was derived from the mental processes
required in attaining the results. The views presented here
are the product of personal evaluation and opinion; and, as
a commissioned officer of the United States Navy, the author
should point out, perhaps needlessly, that they do not neces-
sarily reflect, in any way, the views of the Department of
Defense.
The list of acknowledgments is lengthy, and much of
the help was provided indirectly or through the normal pro-
cedure of classroom discussion. However, one party stands
out as having served above and beyond the call of duty. By
reading page after page of hopelessly scrambled manuscript
and dutifully listening to verbalizations that never at-
tained written form, the writer's wife contributed immea-
surably to any success enjoyed by this study. Failures must
remain the author's sole responsibility.
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This study reveals concern with two primary considera-
tions: nuclear war and its influence on current international
politics; and the roles of military force and strategic plan-
ning within the nuclear environment of foreign affairs. The -
necessity for this analysis would be questionable and the
very existence of the problems that require such study would
be doubtful if it were not for the real presence of war and
the possibility of nuclear war as factors in international
relations. The conduct of foreign relations, the methods of
expressing naval and military science, and overall strategy
formulation should be of deep concern to all; the nature of the
environment in which all of these are conducted should be of
9
no less importance. Many people are convinced that this en-
vironment is considerably different from the one that
developed following World War II. They feel that world af-
fairs and strategic matters must be analyzed in light of a
"new balance"; a nuclear stalemate that has resulted in mani-
fest relaxations of traditional cold war tensions. 4 This
study was thereby undertaken in an attempt to understand more
clearly the degree of relevance that must be attached to
traditional force-forms and strategic planning in a period of
stalemate and accommodation.
This study does not necessarily constitute an exercise
in research technique, although the standard procedures were
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3utilized where it became necessary or advisable to substan-
tiate various positions; but rather, this is an exercise in
"theory evaluation* " As such, it is an essay. The logical
development of the essay consists of a discussion of war in
- general and nuclear war in particular, the strategics of
e
- nuclear war, the development of the new environment as an
outgrowth of nuclear strategics, and finally, the roles of
force and strategy within the new environment*
The findings of the study are briefly as follows:
1. The presence of a new environment is real*
2* The nature of the new environment is political*
3* Policy formulation and power application have
definite limitations*
4* Military objectives must be attuned to realistic
political objectives*
5* There is a great need for public re-orientation to
the nature of the current environment, to the realistic
methods of applying policy decisions, to the practical appli-
cations of military force, and to the desperate need for re-
defined national purpose*
6* 'There is a need for prudence and moderation*'
7* Force roust be existent but flexible; strategy
must be developed in response to realistic purpose and
obtainable objectives*
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CHAPTER I
WAR IN GENERAL AND NUCLEAR WAR IN PARTICULAR
Upon final analysis, this study will reveal concern
with only two primary considerations: nuclear war and its
influence on current international politics; and the roles
of military force and 'strategy within the nuclear environ-
ment of foreign affairs. The necessity for this analysis
would be questionable and the very existence of the problem
that requires such study would be doubtful if it were not
for the real presence of war and the possibility of nuclear
war as factors in international relations. However, before
beginning a discussion of the existing "nuclear environment"
and its influence on force and strategy, it appears desirable
to give a brief look at war in general and nuclear war in
particular.
- 'To accomplish this, effort shall be directed at an
investigation into the nature of and motivation for war, the
birth of nuclear war as a possibility, the effects of the
nuclear age on war, and the present state of the art with
regard to nuclear warfare. Organizationally, the latter
could have been included as a glossary of current termi-
nology, but will be made an integral part of the text in the
hope of providing a common understanding of terms that will
arise throughout the stu
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2War, in one form or another, is a fact of inter-
national life, and there are very few nations in the world
that have been able to escape this reality. It is probably
safe to say that the world is divided into two groups:
those states who have participated in war and those that
will. Although armed conflict has been constant, the moti-
vations for it and the methods of waging and preparing for
it have been infinitely variable. Clausewitz was of the
belief that "war is nothing but the continuation of politi-
cal relations by other means.' But the modalities of the
nuclear age have produced those who cast doubt upon the con-
tinued relevancy of political objectives. As one wit has
pointed out, the verdict of any future war will not rest
upon who is right but rather who is left. This belief will
be questioned later; but, in any event, it is generally con-
ceded tnat war is the reliance of force of arms in the
settlement of quarrels between nations , or occasionally
between two parties of the same nation. Hoffman Nickerson,
a noted military historian, believed that war could be
defined as the use of organized force between human groups
pursuing contradictory policies.
It is often possible for divergent parties to solve
their differences by means of compromise so that each may




L&iiica* uo ano* ©no nl t^W
i*v »^a oisd3 tin* ,»*!! lanoiiiui
i *A* Oi 9^5 8
i*/tt Morij biu «fl a»i*ia •«-.
3<tt »» !*••* at. hcd b»m^> ri^
si's xe»lQi/xi
C ai ©>iw xyiiie ;:




avloa oi i j?i©v.;
->a s»t .<ok>9 a aaon©
^«p»K :op* »gb3 *j
3receive compensation closely akin to original objectives.
However, compromise is a voluntary procedure and cannot be
effective unless both sides agree on certain principles. If
this is not possible, then policy-makers must seek other
techniques for achieving their goals. As a rule, once this
point has been reached, the only method or option left
available is war—or at least its implied threat. It thus
appears that war is not only a likely product of the
decision-making process but a rather logical one. That is
why war as a reality cannot be ignored. War is neither a
pathological accident nor an immoral and irrational exer-
cise, but rather a central feature of the normal theory and
2practice of international relations.
Of all the possible relationships between states, war
has the unique characteristic of being both the least attrac-
tive and yet the most significant. Before the fiery birth
of the nuclear age, however, there was one thing commonly
accepted among potential belligerents: it was taken for
granted that, with minor rectifications and changes, the
post-war environment would resemble the pre-war scene. War,
in other words, was important but not crucial. Its outcome
possessed importance, but it certainly was not a matter of
2Charles 0. Lerche, America in Wor3 Affairs (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 12-lT7
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4sheer survival or extinction* Historically, the result of
this accepted belief was often wars between nations or
groups of nations fostered by the myths, traditions, and
symbols of national pride that were handed down from genera-
tion to generation—many of which were only indirectly
associated with political objectives.
There are many theories on the causes and occasions
of war. These include the popularized "villain," "brass-
button," and "paranoic" theories. Many of these raise more
questions than they answer; but man, driven by reason and
the laws of logic, constantly strives for definitive causes*
Perhaps the real understanding of the nature of and motiva-
tion for war lies in the psychological aspect of "war inter-
pretation." Quincy Wright, in his article "The Psychological
Approach To War and Peace," lists what he believes to be the
basic motivations for war. These are: mutual fear of attack
by two or more nations, rival demands for territory, urge
for political power and prestige, desire for ethnic or group
self-determination, a crusade for a way of life, ideology,
or religion, and even sexual jealousy—which is supposed to
3have been the motivation behind the Homeric siege of Troy.
In a real sense, it may be argued that perhaps the most
3Quincy Wright, "The Psychological Approach To War
and Peace , " The Theory -iad Practice of International Rela-
tions (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-HaTl , 1960), p. 22.
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5obvious cause of war is war itself, or rather the expecta-
tion of war. Since conflicts have occurred in the past,
each state must consider the possibility that another may
occur in the future. States will thereby take steps to pro-
tect themselves against such an eventuality by increasing,
or at least sustaining, their war-making potential. By
taking these steps, states tend to increase international
tension and resulting insecurity can reach the point of open
hostility. /right *s motivations seem to be all inclusive,
and acceptance of his theory leads one to believe that wars
are purely psychological in nature. This may be true, but
war is toe complex to lend itself to such an easy explana-
tion. This became particularly true on July 16, 1945.
On this date, over the early morning desert of
Alamogordo, New Mexico, the United States and the world be-
came irrevocably committed to the atomic age. The following
month witnessed the first utilization of atomic weapons as a
means of military force. Within four years, the possession
of functional atomic weapons was not the sole and dubious
honor of om country, and by 1954 the atomic age had become
the age of possible thermonuclear incineration.
Many speak of the advent of atomic weapons as the
most momentous military invention since gunpowder. But it
would appear that this questionable comparison places too
much importance on the introduction of gunpowder. Not only




6did the military revolution that was triggered by gunpowder
take centuries to manifest itself, but the gun and its
associated weapons have remained to this day tactical tools
of war. Atomic weapons, on the other hand, were the result
of a fantastically compressed technological period. They
were eventually to indicate a theoretical applicability as
tactical weapons but were considered the "ultimate" in
strategic weaponry. In addition, the technology of nuclear
weapons produced a situation that only has marginal his-
toric parallels: for the first time the offensive aspects
of conflict won a decisive victory over the defensive. One
cannot help but wonder if the world is not on the ascending
slope of a logarithmic curve of technology where the next
fifty years will see even swifter changes in technical
accomplishment.
It is true that the appearance of nuclear weapons had
the initial impact of only furthering the belief tnat war
was, more than ever, a matter 3olely of armed force. Yet,
the atomic bomb, and particularly thermonuclear devices,
have revolutionized the conduct of large-scale war* These
awesome weapons have produced an even greater effect on the
way in which warfare can be waged under the guise of peace;
for example, the machinations of what is commonly referred
to as the cold war. As early as 1952 and 1953, Jefense De-
partment officials in th United States were speaking of the
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7total destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the "stalemate"
that feasibly could result. The major nuclear powers un-
doubtedly recognized the flexibility that "stalemate" pro-
vided in the pursuit of political objectives. So, perhaps,
the ultimate significance of nuclear weapons will be the
background which they furnish to a vast array of unconven-
tional, or psychological, methods of waging "war." The
possessors of nuclear destruction seem to be faced with the
strange paradox of conducting international relations in a
world in which force tends to be both increasingly more
available, increasingly more dangerous to use and, in prac-
tice, increasingly less usable. But the fact remains that
the United States has engaged in a military effort unprece-
dented in history, and yet the effort has proved inadequate
to the challenge. The sporadic nature of the effort has
been caused by many factors, the major of which perhaps is
the nature of the American historical experience. Tradition
impels Americans to believe that peace is the normal rela-
tion among states—not seeming to realize the unique change
rendered in the international environment. As a result, the
United States has assembled an overwhelmingly powerful force
designed to "punish" the disturbers of peace. The diffi-
culty in harnessing this force to a set of realistic and
comprehensible objectives surely has given the United States
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4
strong overtones of frustration. As suggested a moment
ago, the perfection of the techniques of war in the nuclear
age has ironically destroyed their usefulness. Few objec-
tives beyond sheer survival are worth the cost of victory.
Since 1945 and 1949, nuclear technique has grown com-
paratively simpler, the sums of money expended proportion-
ately smaller, the time lag between the invention of nuclear
and thermonuclear devices shorter. In this sense, the pro-
gression from American monopoly to a Soviet-American duopoly,
and the extension to a general understanding throughout the
world concerning atomic warfare, is a symbol of the course
of political affairs since 1945, and has contributed unmis-
takably to the current environment. It may also be said
that the discovery of atomic weapons has proven prejudicial
to the long-range interests of the United States—and to the
Soviet Union. Like the gunpowder of another age, nuclear
weapons must have the ultimate result of making the small
5the equal of the great. However, the brutal fact remains
that a state cannot afford to rely on its nuclear arsenal as
its chief means of waging war. This would amount to an
acceptance of paralysis within the policy-making organs of
government. Once again, the final result of nuclear weapons
4Lerche, 0£. clt . , pp. 14-15.
5
Edmund Stillman and William Ffaff, The New Politics
(New York: KcCann, 1961), pp. 134-135.
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9is to deprive force of its traditional utility, leaving the
nuclear states with less usable power than they had before *r
That brings us to the current state of the art. What
is the "threat potential" of war today? According to
Bernard Brodie,
• • • the threat of war, open or implied, has always
been an instrument of diplomacy by which one state
deterred another from doing something of a military
or political nature which the former did not wish the
latter to do. 6 ^
Does this have real applicability in the new environment?
<
That will be the principal question, content, and argument
of Chapter III; however, in order to supply a minimum founda-
tion and for the sake of completeness in this discussion of
the development of all-out war, the following "characteris-
tics'* seem to apply to the present state of nuclear war;
1. In the post-World War II era, the United States
has realized that security is inextricably meshed with the
safety of the rest of the world. The resulting alliance
system is composed of nuclear and non-nuclear states with
nuclear and non-nuclear strategies.
2. In the nuclear age, industrial strength is a
military asset only to the extent that it can provide arma-
ments before the outbreak of war.
g
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3. In the not too distant past, national strategy
was the exclusive concern of only a few men* Today, stra-
tegy is total. It involves every facet of society and
should be the concern of every knowledgeable person in the
world.
4. The gradual shift from possession of an atomic
monopoly toward a position of virtual nuclear parity with
the Soviet Union has depriv „ th United States of a mili-
tary advantage.
5. There has been a shift from a strategy of mobili-
zation to a strategy of deterrence.
6. War can no longer be considered a delicate surgery
to a confined part of the earth's surface; it is now possible
7to practice universal butchery.
* In addition to these traits , it seems appropriate to
establish at least a minimum understanding of what is meant
by certain words, terms, and phrases that float around in
the public domain of nuclear war lexicography. Some will
reappear, others will only enjoy this single exposure. Al-
though some are ambiguous and defined in relation to schools
of thought or personal interpretation, the following descrip-
tions are those that will be utilized within the context of
7Robert Rienow, Contemporary International Politics
(New York j Crowell, 1961), p. 51.
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this study* It will be discovered quickly that a few of
these Involve as much discussion or elaboration as they do
simple and antiseptic diagnosis.
1* Force : Force may assume different forms, but
this study will consider force as a nation 1 s ability to
protect its national interests.
2. Strategy : The classic interpretation of strategy
cannot be ignored. It is the science and art of employing
armed strength in order to secure the objectives of war, and,
in turn, the objectives of the state. When this is applied
to the nuclear age, certain refinements and distinctions
have to be made. A very considerable effort in the past few
years has gone into the problem of reducing military stra-
tegy to more measurable terms than science and art. This is
particularly true in the relationship of strategy to tech-
nology. Strategy has become a method of selecting the
military weapons and forces to secure or retain the objec-
tives of the nation, with objectives themselves determining
or influencing the choice. Some have said that the nuclear
age has rendered strategy irrelevant; but as long as nuclear
war is a possibility, and as long as selection of systems is
involved, then strategy will be involved. Modern weapon
selection is made from a selection of technologlej and is at
least partially affected by policy decisions regarding eco-
nomic resources. Strategy, therefore, is not an isolated
XI
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concept. It is part of a complex interaction of national
values, policy formulation, allocation of resources, and
technology.
3* Massive retaliation : The term and policy entered
into public usage in January of 1954 in a speech by John
Foster Dulles. Whether or not this usage was accompanied by
a modicum of understanding is not fully documented. John
Spanier cryptically says that "no policy could have been
g
more typically American than massive retaliation. " The
policy—or more accurately: the strategy—was designed to
deter an attack from the Sino-Soviet powers by drawing a
line around their periphery and creating the pointed impli-
cation that instant devastation would rain upon Moscow or
Peking if the line were violated. The prevailing belief was
that the United States would be relieved of reacting to ex-
ternal stimuli at times and places of the enemy's choosing.
Military considerations were to be dominant during the ensu-
ing war, and the only cause for war would be enemy aggression.
Military power in the form of nuclear weapons were to be un-
leashed only in reaction to a hostile attack; the enemy
could not escape without punishment or risk; and he was to
Q
Walter P. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.), American
Strategy for the uclear Age (New York: Doubleday , 1960 )
,
p. 176.
gJohn W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World
War II (New York: Fraeger, 1962), p. 144.""
t ««ui
dcj! m









be crushed by complete defeat. Mr* Dulles, if no one else,
believed the strategy to be effective, economical, and
morally superior. In brief summary, massive retaliation may
be thought of as a nuclear bombardment of maximum magnitude
triggered by external aggression.
4. Limited retaliation : The public tends to think
of potential war in one of two extremes: all-out thermo-
nuclear war, or limited war. Actually, there are several
gradations possible between these parameters. Glenn Snyder,
in his book Deterrence and Defense , suggests a strategy
within what he calls a "spectrum of violence" that is some-
where short of complete incineration. This is limited
retaliation. It is defined as a strategy of sincle, small,
successive nuclear strikes directed against an opponent
after the opponent has initiated tactical ground aggression
of major proportions. The purpose is to deter additional
aggression and to actually begin reprisal on a limited
scale, with the hope of persuading the aggressor to cease
and desist under pain of an eventual accumulation of human
and material costs which would more than offset the advan-
tages derived from aggression.
'• Deterrence : This is indeed an enigmatic subject,
but an attempt to establish a framework for future discussion
Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 193.
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necessitates a brief mention of this much misunderstood con-
cept. Regardless of whose definition one chooses to use,
the two principal ingredients of deterrence are cost and
gain. In as few words as possible, deterrence may be de-
fined as the discouraging of an enemy from taking military
action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk that
outweighs his prospective gains* To be truly effective,
this deterrence should not only project a picture of devas-
tation if it were released, but it should also imply that
world conditions are probably better prior to a nuclear war
than after*
6* Graduated deterrence ; This term general refers
to the means employed in warfare with regard to the area of
engagement* Graduated deterrence, consequently, requires
that the area be restricted to a minimum and that atomic
weapons of the smallest possible yield be used within this
area* In essence, this calls for the use of tactical atomic
weapons on a conventional battlefield* Some authorities feel
that this condition is only the initial step in a process
leading to all-out thermonuclear war where the involvement
of nuclear weapons and the area concerned quickly expand*
They construe this entire process as graduated deterrence,
and it is obvious that this would perhaps satisfy the defini-
tion of "escalation" as well.
7. Finite deterrence and counterforce strategy :
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These two terms are considered simultaneously because the
understanding of one relies upon an understanding of the
other* The difference between the two turns on the nature
of the threat which produces deterrence; either the primary
goal of the deterrent force is the elimination of the oppos-
ing military establishment, or the proper target is the
aggressor's war-making potential and civilian population.
The former is counterforce strategy; the latter is finite
deterrence
•
8. Punitive capability : It may be useful to asso-
ciate this term with finite deterrence* Punitive capability
is the amount of destruction inflicted upon an enemy's
economy and population.
9. Counterforce capability ; This is quite naturally
associated with counterforce strategy, and it refers to the
degree of attrition which may be inflicted upon an enemy's
military establishment—particularly his nuclear forces.
10. Multldeterrence i It should be rather obvious
that a single deterrent is unlikely to cover an entire range
of contingencies with feasibility. There is a need for
something more, as suggested by Henry Kissinger:
Whatever aspect of our strategic problem we consider—
mitigating the horrors of war, creating a spectrum of
capabilities to resist likely Soviet challenges—we
11
"Ttenry A. Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New
York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 28.
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axe brought to recognize the importance of developing
a strategy which makes room for the possibility of
limited war .12
It has become quite apparent that a nation endowed with both
nuclear and conventional military resources is in a position
to voice certain claims and to make a show of force in sup-
port of those claims that is both credible and free of in-
tolerable risk. This diversification of forces and the
adoption of a strategy marked by more limited goals, but
added flexibility of means, is multideterrence. Put another
way, multideterrence is a strategy or posture in the same
sense that massive retaliation is a strategy or posture. It
is the possession of a force designed to counter every sort
of threat the enemy might make wherever he might make it.
Counter-aggression would thus be appropriate to the catalytic
aggression.
11. Defense : Glenn Snyder believes that defense is
an extension of deterrence and differs only with respect to
a time frame; that is, deterrence is primarily a peacetime
objective while defense is a wartime value. Another pos-
sible comparison concerns the purpose of military forces
prior to enemy attack and following enemy attack. The deter-
rent value of these forces are enjoyed prior to attack; the
defensive value is enjoyed after attack. Defense,
12Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harpers, 1957), p. 172.
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accordingly, is the effectuation of a psychological posture
with an attack upon the established forces serving as the
trigger. It might even be said that defense occurs only
after deterrence fails.
12. Pre-emptive attack : This type of attack is some-
what defensive in nature in that it is an attack launched
after an opponent has set his own strategic attack in motion
but before it is consummated.
13. Preventive attack : The public consumers of nu-
clear age information tend to confuse preventive attack with
pre-emptive attack. There is a vital difference. Preventive
attack refers to a premeditated attack by one country upon
another during a period of relative calm or MM :e of
crisis and is prompted by the belief that nuclear exchange
is inevitable; that it is in the national interests to de-
liver the first blow—thereby enjoying the element of sur-
prise—and that by delivering the initial strike the chances
of unacceptable retaliation will be reduced substantially,
if not eliminated.
14. First-strike capability : This must be viewed
with reference to force. It is the amount of damage that a
force would be capable of inflicting upon an enemy if it
struck the enemy first.
15. Strike-back or second-strike capability . As
inferred, this pertains to the degree of damage which would
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be inflicted upon an enemy after the enemy had struck first
and destroyed a portion of the target nation* s first-strike
capability. It is obvious, of course, that any given pre-
war force will have both a first-strike and a second-strike
capability, depending on whether it is used before any enemy
13
attack or after. Care should be taken not to confuse
second-strike capability with residual forces which either
side may have left in reserve after having struck once*
16. Credibility : Credibility is applied to a situa-
tion that is worthy of belief. There may be degrees of
credibility, each dependent upon the interpretation, force-
fulness and/or logic that a particular situation presents.
When viewed within a framework of nuclear war strategy,
credibility usually refers to a psychological aura created
by a nuclear power with regard to its deterrent force. In
substance, it is making an enemy believe that you possess
sufficient operational power to render his country and its
military and economic capability helpless if he shculd be so
foolish as to provoke you with aggression. Yet, it is not
enough to simply convey the possession of such power; more
importantly, it is necessary to make the enemy believe that
you have the full intention of using your power as a deter-
rent force.
13Snyder , 0£. clt . , p
.







17, War potential : The word potential tends to de-
note possibility; perhaps it would be more accurate to use
the phrase "war inventory." Nevertheless, war potential is
frequently utilized, and the best operational explanation
—
and one that does not bog down in rainutia—seems to be found
in the book Military Policy and National Security , edited by
William Kaufmann. War potential, according to this source,
includes a country's economic capacity, its administrative
14
competence, and its morale or motivation for war.
In summarization, an attempt has been made to capsulate
the following considerations:
1. War, or the reliance upon force to settle diver-
gent positions, has a long if not disappointing iistory of
occurrence in international relations. The motivations for
this conflict have varied but may be considered fundamentally
psychological in nature.
2. War has historically been, and still is, an end-
product of the decision-making process—and before the dawn
of nuclear weapons, was a logical possibility.
3. One of the unique characteristics of nuclear
technology is the emphasis that it has placed upon strategic
weaponry, resulting in the offensive aspects of conflict
14,William W. Kaufmann ed , ) , Military Policy and
National Security (Princeton: Princeton Univer sit Press,
i$5<5), P . i5fi.
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being thrust into predominance at the expense of more con-
ventional defensive techniques*
4* It is true that the environment that has resulted
from the above has permitted a certain degree of flexibility
in the conduct of international relations, but paradoxically
the nuclear age has also largely neutralized all-out war—
the very thing made possible by the advent of atomic science.
5. Lastly, a selective glossary of current termi-
nology relating to nuclear war and strategic planning was
presented in order to establish a common foundation for addi-
tional discussion.
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CHAPTER II
NUCLEAR WAR STRATEGICS
The literary, as wall as the actual, construction of
a foundation upon which ttm "new environment n must be built,
and upon which Military force and strategy must be consid-
ered, requires something more than a brief look at environ-
mental characteristics and a condensation of nuclear war
terminology* The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to
provide additional strength for that foundation by discussing
the strategics of nuclear war* This will include a more
detailed investigation of deterrence, the classical role of
military force and its relationship to deterrence, and,
finally, succinct and hopefully incjisive descriptions of the
nuclear strategies of Containment, hassive Retaliation,
Preventive war, and Multldetei .ence*
Deterrence, in one sense, is simply the negative
aspect of political powers it is the power to dissuade as
opposed to the power to coerce or compel* Country A
attempts to deter Country B from; committing some act con-
sidered detrimental to Country A by the implicit or explicit
threat of applying some sanction if the forbidden act is
performed* In conformance with the standards of current
Glenn H* Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1961 J, p. 9.""
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military-political jargon, thia strategy ia generally re-
ferred to aa deterrence! the difference between it and
'"•defense" being that it la only rmfmxred to aa '-defense'*
after Country A ia attacked* It ia plausible to aay that
deterrence does not even have to depend on military force*
Deterrence might take the form of a threat through trade
restrictions or through the promise of economic aid; nor
does deterrence have to apply only to real or imagined
enemies* The deterrence of allies or neutrals can be effec-
tive, as Italy, for example, was dissuaded from fighting on
the aide of the Central Powers in World War I by the promise
given in 1915 of substantial territorial gains. In any
event, deterrence ia a function of the total c t— oin ex-
pectations of the party to be deterred, and the focus shall
be on military force and its related strategies.
Henry Kissinger suggests that successful deterrence
requires three fundamental ingredients* These are power,
the will to uae that power, and a valid assessment of these
by a potential aggressor* These basic prerequisites appear
reasonable enough, but certain aspects are not fully elab-
orated* Despite the simple truth contained in Kissinger 'a
suggestion, a closer look at both sides of the "cost-risk
2Henry A* Kissinger, The Necessity For Choice (New
Yorks Doubleday, 1962), p*
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equation" is necessary before analysis of a successful or
unsuccessful deterrent can be made* The entire logic of
deterrence is predicated upon the "cost-risk equation • " The
object is to reduce the probability of enemy attacks by
posing for the potential aggressor a realistic prospect of a
net loss as the result of any attack that he might launch*
What must the aggressor assess and evaluate before reaching
a decision to initiate aggression? Study revea ur
points that constitute one side of the equation:
1* The value and necessity of the aggressor's pro-
posed war objectives.
2* The price that the aggressor is willing to pay in
order to achieve these objectives*
3* The type of response the target nation will make*
4* The question of being able to "stay ahead" in
ensuing exchanges and ultimately win the pre—attack objec-
tives •
The deterrer's side of the equation is similar to
that of the aggressor* If the deterrer is rational, then
his considerations would probably include the following:
1* The value placed on territorial protection and
the amount of moral satisfaction derived by a particular
type of response*
2* An estimate of the costs involved in an exchange*
3* The probability of successfully holding the
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territorial objective and other values that would be at
stake*
4* The effect of various responses on any future
attacks by the aggressor* Ultimately , trie deterrex should
select the response which minimizes his expectation of cost
3
and/or maximizes his expectation of gain*
Prior to pursuing an expanded rationalization of the
requirements for successful deterrence, it would seem de-
sirable to say a brief word about defense planning* It has
been suggested that deterrence is a passive form of defense*
Planning for defense involves an estimate of the capabili-
ties and intentions of other nations* If defense planning
relies solely on the overt actions of other nations 9 then a
consistent and realistic posture is extremely difficult to
maintain when one considers the annual budgetary problems of
the United States and the various lags that can occur be-
tween requisition, appropriation, and acquisition*
Planning for defense is complicated in another way*
Defense can be accomplished by a combination of defensive
and offensive means* Consider for a moment the air defense
of the continental United States* In defending against an
The "cost-risk equation" concept is certainly not
new* The basic rationale behind the interpretation pre-
sented here is directly attributable to Glenn Jnyder's
Deterrence and Defense *
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air attack, it would be useful to possess strategic airpower
to strike enemy airfields and launching sites; to possess a
defensive air capability in the form of warning nets, fighter
aircraft, and anti-aircraft guns or anti-missile devices
capable of neutralising eneay delivery vehicles that would
undoubtedly penetrate the outer defensive shell $ and to
possess such passive defensive measures as dispersion,
mobility, shelters, and civil defense in general* Collec-
tively, these form a deterrent* Once again, budgetary con-
siderations can result in conflict, confusion, and possibly
In an inadequate deterrent force* Where does defense end and
offense begin? Where should budgetary emphasis be placed,
and who makes the decision/ This appears to be particularly
relevant and wl U be explored later in the study*
One additional point should be made with regard to
defense planning* In preparation of a five-year fiscal pro-
gram and in submitting a specific fiscal-year budget, the
Department of Defense is currently guided by the policy re-
quirement of "(developing) the force structure necessary to
meet • • • military requirements without regard to arbitrary
budget ceilings or pre-determined financial limits, and to
procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost."
4Robert 3* HcNamara, Secretary of Defense, Department
of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense
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This presents the interesting puzzle of determining and
recognizing the point of diminishing returns, where each
additional increment of resources used produces a propor-
tionately smaller increment of overall defense capability*
Secretary McNamara suggests that this problem applies to the
question of qualitative improvements in weapons systems as
well as to quantitative increases in the force level*
The complex relationship between what properly con-
stitutes a successful deterrent and how that deterrent is to
be designed, operated, and maintained lies beyond the pre-
determined scope of this study* But in view of what has
been said, the following minimum considerations should be
made in determining a successful deterrents
1* The defender should possess the appropriate
forces designed to meet the specific type of attack a poten-
tial aggressor is capable of launching and the type of
attack that he most likely intends to launch*
2* The defender must be willing to use his military
force if sufficiently provoked*
3* The potential aggressor must have a reasonably
accurate estimate of the defender's capabilities and inten-
tions*
and Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington: Department
of Defense, January, 1964), p* 2.
5Thia presents an interesting conflict with the
attempt to keep such information out of enemy hands*
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4* The defender must take into account the values of
the potential aggressor, and this is of principal importance
if they differ from his own*
5* The potential aggressor must be rational*
It is recognized that there are many variables em-
bedded among these basic requirements—such as the number
and type of aggressor attack vehicles likely to be used, the
timeliness and reliability of the defender *s warning system,
the aggressor's threshold of unacceptable damage, plus many
more* For effective deterrence, though, the most relevant
consideration is how these variables are estimated by the
potential attacker* If it is assumed that a possible at-
tacker is rational—and this was one of the requirements for
successful deterrence—then basic deterrence involves little
strain on ermdlbi ty* The enemy would appreciate the
purpose | the question is one of feasibility* The road to
nuclear evaporation is paved with good intentions*
The strategy of deterrence should always consider the
possibility of "deterrence failure* " Therein lies the prob-
lem of feasibility* Deterrence could fail despite military
strength, and curiously enough, because of It* Identifying
deterrence with maximum power tends to paralyse the will*
It requires a country to stake survival on the credibility
of a threat which could become increasingly difficult to
implement and, if implemented, would result in the very type
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of war that the original strategy was designed to avoid*
There is a possibility of being trapped in an inverse rela-
tionship: as strength increases, will to use strength
decreases*
In America, however, traditions tend to rule out any
thoughts that are based on the assumption that the American
people will, at the most critical moment, be subject to the
same kind of errors which humans have always been suscep-
tible to—such as deficiencies in alertness, judgment, or
failure to maintain singleness of purpose. There is a be-
lief that the "Great Deterrent** will work simply because it
must work, tfavid KcLellan, in his Theory and Practice of
International Relations > points out that
... instead of developing our military potential
along diversified lines designed to contain the
Soviets at a minimum cost to ourselves, we based our
military strategy upon a fleeting superiority of
atomic air power which, in the end, we were unwilling
to employ and which, as Korea showed, did not make us
invulnerable to aggression. Military power is only
meaningful in relation to strategy and strategy is
only meaningful in relation to national objectives
and willingness to pursue those objectives •*$
Surely conditions within the American public and body-
politic have changed appreciably in the last ten years.
Whether they have or not, world conditions have changed. If
massive retaliation was to continue as the sole adopted
David S. HcLellan et al. , The Theory and Practice of
International Relations ( Englewood Cliffs t Prentice-HaTT,
I960), p. 144 .
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strategy, then the nation had to be prepared to use it* But
then a country is faced with the peculiar dilemma of either
having too much deterrent for a given situation, or having
to resort to all-out war everytirae the deterrent is exer-
cised* Kissinger contends that this will almost inevitably
operate against the side which can extricate Itself from a
7
situation only by the threat of general war* Although this
argument was more prevalent five years ago, it still bears
heavy significance* Fortunately, it appears that the
dilemma r^fw:r^d to is in the process of rectification* It
must be assumed that this change is accompanied by a propor-
tionately high© 'will to utilise. "
Before taking up military force, it should be empha-
sised that perhaps the important factor is not the symmetry
or asymmetry of offensive power within a country, or in
comparison with another country, but rather the stability of
the balance between countries* Bernard Brodie has written
that stability is achieved when nuclear nations believe that
the strategic advantage of striking first is overshadowed by
the tremendous cost of doing so* 9 The communication of
intent between nations will undoubtedly assume added emphasis
7Henry A* Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harpers, 195/}, p* 133*
Q
Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Prince-
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in an attempt to maintain the all-important balance* The
Washington-Moscow "hot-line," butt of cartoonist and pundit
alike, is a serious example of this attempt* Also, it has
been implied that the function of military force may be in
the process of shifting* Future warfare may well be less a
matter of raw physical force and more a contest of wills,
with military power serving as a tool within a framework of
bargaining and mutual concession* History will have to pro-
vide the answer as to whether or not military force will re-
assume this classical role* With this in mind, let us
proceed to an investigation of force*
It is obvious that any study of nuclear war, regard-
less of scope, must include consideration of military force
within the area of strategics* In addition, it provides a
reference point for the analysis, in Chapter IV, of force
and the new environment*
Force Is the engine that propels the vehicle of war*
Military force has historically performed three main func-
tions in the process of international politics* First, it
has served as an index to the power and prestige of a nation*
Second, it has served as a function of negotiation* Third,
it has served as a persuader in armed conflict, both as a
deterrent to actual combat and as an expediter of combat*
The cohesive factor that has traditionally bound these
functions together and given them purpose has been the
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political objectives of the nation concerned; for in the
final analysis, the worth or utility of military force must
be measured in political terms-—especially if "political" is
defined as the advancing or preservation of national objec-
tives* After all y the prime goal of a state in international
politics Is the survival of the state Itself; therefore,
military force becomes only a means and not an end*
David HcLellan suggests that the political interests
of victor and vanquished alike have h^wi swept away by the
destructiveness of total war, principally because of the
9
addition of hydrogen weapons to the arsenals of war* But
as long as war *aalns a possibility in international rela-
tions, the important Issue seems to be one of how much and
what kind of military force is most appropriate to a nation's
goals* As mentioned a moment ago, military force can serve
as a deterrent to armed conflict* The prevention of such
conflict certainly possesses the characteristics of a worthy
political objective*
How is this military power to be measured I Three
generalised criteria are obvious: (1) there must be a force
available for deterring or successfully meeting any threats
to the vital interests of the state; (2) there should be no
doubt in the minds of others that the state has the will and
o
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competence to use its force effectively) and (3) there must
exist a system of responsible control over the force* De-
spite the value in recognising these guidelines, they do not
overtly suggest the many problems involved in the creation
and maintenance of a required military force in a nuclear
war environment* The problems are far more complex and far
less susceptible to rational postulation*
First of all, the policy-maker is confronted by an
enormous range of weapons and must select the appropriate
weapons systems that he feels will adequately meet all
threats* This large stable of military possibilities costs
money, and few nations, unless their national survival is
clearly at stake, are willing to make the necessary sacri-
fices in order to be militarily secure* This results in a
constant strain between divergent value systems* However
compelling the concept of an adequate military force may be,
it must be constantly weighed against correspondingly impor-
tant considerations of education, health, basic scientific
research, capital investment, and overall economic alloca-
tions* Furthermore, all Americans agree that the United
States is a democracy-—whatever the much-abused word may
mean* In any case, the policy-maker cannot operate within a
vacuum in this type of society* It is assumed that one of
the essential elements in any democratic government is the





is the sticky atmosphere in which the formulatora of policy
and the makers of decision must function* The lines of in-
fluence originate with the general public, with various
interest groups, from with! I political parties, through the
outlets of mass media, and from various elite groups* But
they should all converge at a common locus* It is at this
focal point that the extent of military force must be deter-
Lastly, if military force is only a means of obtain-
ing national objectives, then what relationship—if any—do
the means have in determining the ultimate goals of the
state ? This subject will be examined later; but in passing
let it be said that it would appear meaningless, if not in-
dicative of sheer stupidity, for a nation to develop costly
strategies utilizing military force which have little or no
relation to the permissible or attainable goals of national
policy. If a nation is uncertain about its objectives, it
can well decimate its economic viability on futile strategies
that have no meaning in the real world* The dubious conse-
quences would probably be a weakened military force and utter
confusion within the nation and among allies* The assessment
of military force must be carried out within the context of
realistic political purposes as well as that of human values*
A quick review at this point reveals that force is
related to the decision-making process and that this process
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involves selection of various modes of force in the con-
struction of a military posture* This selective procedure
is, in actuality, the crux of strategy* This chapter on
nuclear war strategics, therefore, will be concluded with a
discussion of strategies associated with the post-World War
XI period* It has been said that history is the graveyard of
strategies, for man has not yet learned to master his fate*
Strategies and war techniques come and go, but peace remains
as elusive as ever* However, a visit to the cemetery may
provide an insight or two* This particular trip will con-
sist of a preliminary and general look at strategic planning,
and then analyses of Containment, Massive Retaliation, Pre-
ventive war, and finally, Kultideterranee*
The present world environment presents many complex
and difficult *—obleras with regard to the strategic implica-
tions of general war* We are not even certain that there
will be a general war* But the possibility cannot be com-
pletely ignored and a long-range perspective should be
applied to strategic planning* The concept of strategy was
mentioned earlier when it was stated that strategy is a
means of reaching certain pre—determined objectives by means
of selection* There was also a suggestion that objectives
will occasionally influence means* The first step in the
process of strategic planning, therefore, appears to be the
formulation of goals*
n
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The necessary relationship between fundamental
decision-making and the adoption of a comprehensive strategy
is indeed compounded* Aside from the direct sequence of
decisions that eventually leads to the inception of a spe-
cific strategy, there are eddy currents of indirect influ-
ence; such as, physical and economic resources, science,
techno* gy, and politically-inspired opinions* But at the
base of the decision-making process lies the very profound—
and often very obscure—interpretation of human, moral, and
religious values* Within this framework, the United States
attempts to discover her naclonal goals* On the basis of
these goals, he policies determining the allocation of
resources are made and followed in the sequence by the
selection of a national strategy which includes foreign
policy, trade policies, foreign aid, and military policy-
all of which are hopelessly intertwined*
As once said, military strategy involves selection of
weapons systems and forces that will best secure the objec-
tives of the nation* This selection is based upon a variety
of available systems and forces but is constrained by policy
decisions responsible for the allocation of resources* The
resulting interaction between national values, policy, allo-
cation of resources, and military strategy is continuous and
not without danger* The ever-changing complexion of the
national environment can easily result in failure to realise
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that the enemy for which the strategy was designed also
possesses national values, ideological beliefs, and general
policy guidelines. There is a tendency to overlook the fact
that strategy is a broa* -sword capable of cutting in two
directions* The importance of this horrendous metaphor lies
in tht: fact that a nation should never settle for a short-
range power or political advantage when there is a wide
range of long-term choices* The risk of losing the initia-
tive, or of being caught in an awkward or untenable military
position is tremendous* It seems reasonable to predict that
force of some kind will be used to resolve international
issues* The United States should be careful to avoid rigid
postures that invariably produce rapidly diminishing stra-
tegic flexibility* Strategic thinking and planning should
not be too narrow in scope, too low in quality, nor too
short-term* What have been the suggestions resulting from
the "strategy-selection* process—or possibly worse yet,
the positions actually adopted?
Containment » A secret memorandum forwarded to the
State Department in 1946 outlined th basic elements of
Containment* The following year, these same elements were
published in Foreign Affairs over the signature of "Mr. X, M
who, as it turned out, was George Kennan, then Director of
the State Department's Policy Planning Staff* Like any true
declaration of strategic policy, Containment consisted of
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assumptions concerning the capabilities, limitations, and
intentions of the Soviet Union and the United States, sug-
gestions for courses of action, and anticipated results*
The purpose was originally long-term, with the United
States assuming a position of patient but firm vigilance
that would entail persistence, flexibility, and resourceful-
ness in an attempt to stem Soviet expansion of influence
throughout the world* There were two end-products expected:
first, Containment would check Communistic influence and
prevent the addition of countries to the Red bloc; second,
by continually frustrating their efforts, it would force the
Communists to abandon their expansive tendencies* As Kennan
pointed out, political leadership cannot afford to pursue
policies that continually result in frustration, the belief
being, of course, that the Soviet leaders were largely in-
stilled with political and national interests like all other
politicians
•
President Truman added one significant ingredient to
this fundamentally political-military strategy* He gave it
ideological content: the defense of liberty and the pursuit
of happiness* This change in orientation from a strategy of
power-versus-power to a campaign for liberty created a dll
from which American foreign policy has not yet fully escaped*
Amitai Etsionl, The Hard Way To Peace (New York:
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This amendment deprived the United States of much military
and political flexibility and made every piece of real
estate this side of the Iron Curtain part of the American
moral and military commitment* Thus, we see one of the many
paradoxes that have characterized post-war and nuclear age
international relations* The addition of an ideological
intonation to Containment was for the purpose of strengthen-
ing the policy; the actual result was one of weakening it
and causing its demise* Flexibility was transmuted into
rigidity*
In addition, the means of effectuating Containment was
to prove equally fatal* This was atomic bombardment* The
United States assumed that the principal danger lay in the
possibility of a large-scale attack by Russia on the American
mainland* Such an attack, it was believed, could only be
averted by the threat of atomic retaliation upon Mother
Russia* It took the Korean War, as well as the Greek civil
war, to drive the lesson home: the real danger was not an
attack directly on the United States* France's humiliation
in Indochina provided the second lesson: atomic bombing was
not an effective way to "contain" Communism* The United
States was to turn, as this narrative is about to do, to the
strategy of Massive Retaliation*
Massive Retaliation : It is usually agreed that the
shortcomings of Containment were dramatised during the Korean
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War by the conflict between President Truman and General
Douglas MacArthur. The basic argument has been aired fre-
quently, often inconclusively) and although Truman's ad-
herence to the general policy of Containment prevailed, the
strategy emerged from Korea severely wounded and proved to
be the crisis out of which the subsequent policy of Massive
Retaliation was to arise*
The 1953 inauguration of a Republican administration
resulted in the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secre-
tary of State* It was Dulles, with the passive support of
President Eisenhower and the active support of Admiral
Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
formulated the new American strategy* The heart of this
policy can best be described in Secretary Dulles' own words:
(the new policy is to depend) * • • primarily upon a
great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and
at places of our own choosing* Now the Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff can shape our
military establishment to fit what is our policy,
instead of having to try to be ready to meet the
enemy's many choices* That permits a selection of
military means instead of a multiplication of means*
As a result, it is now possible to get, and share*
more basic security at less cost.* 1
Massive Retaliation, according to Dulles, would be
effective, economical, and morally superior to Containment*
It would not allow an enemy to escape without risk or without
Reproduced in The New York Times , January 13, 1954*
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punishment* The focal point of the new policy was deter-
rence. Theoretically v it forced potential aggressors to cope
with the "cost-risk equation* " They would not be stopped by
a row of machine guns in trenches, but by a psychological
12barrier* The advantages of the "New Look" appeared clears
(1) it provided the United States with flexibility and con-
centrated power—both familiar to military scientists; (2)
it provided "more bang for the buck"! (3) it conformed to the
historic American pattern of "aggressor punishment" j and (4)
it provided hope for those under Communist domination | for
if and when Red power was broken through nuclear bombing,
countries behind the Iron Curtain would be liberated* In
fact. Massive Retaliation only had one disadvantage: it did
not work* It received its major test only one year after
the Korean armistice was signed and was found to be less
than adequate* The year 1954 not only marked the French
loss in Indochina, after French appeals to the United States,
but the fact that a war started in Indochina in the first
place meant that Massive Retaliation had failed to deter,
the very thing it was designed to do best—not to mention
"rolling back," "liberation," or "punishment*" At the same
time, the American monopoly on hydrogen weapons was broken
and the Russian stockpile of atomic weapons reached a point
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of near-parity with the United States , both in numbers and in
delivery methods* In any event, the strategy of Massive
Retaliation was to remain, to a major degree, the basic
orientation of American defense policy until the early
1960*8, and its remnants are still embedded within the
policy structure*
Preventive war * The concept of nuclear war and the
disadvantages of Containment and Massive Retaliation has led
to the consideration—at least by a few—-of a provocative
strategy that should be included in this discussion of nu-
clear war strategics* It is unlikely that it will ever
become an active "expression of will," but the logic has a
magnetic quality* It is the strategy of Preventive war*
What may appear to be undue emphasis in relation to the two
previously-mentioned strategies is the result of fascination
and the belief that it is less familiar*
As mentioned earlier, preventive attack refers to a
premeditated assault by one country upon another during a
period of relative calm or absence of crisis* The resulting
aftermath would be Preventive war* Refinement of this is
possible by reading Bernard Brodle's explanation* He writes
that preventive strategy consists of "... a premeditated
attack by one country against another which is unprovoked
in the sense that it does not wait upon a specific aggression
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or other overt action by the target state," The strategy
of Preventive war, as a distinct possibility, has unceremo-
niously died, assuming, of course, that it once had life.
Only a small core of earnest adherents guard the grave.
Pressures in favor of the idea diminished as the Soviet
Union developed their nuclear capability and as the United
States adapted to the environment of the nuclear age.
Nevertheless, Preventive war remains as a theoretical alter-
native for the strategy—makers, and the premises and logic
behind it deserve at least a cursory examination.
The argument for Preventive war is rather simple. It
rests primarily upon four assumptions: (1) the initiating
country *s defensive capability lags behind its offensive
capability in effectiveness; (2) no technological improve-
ments are foreseen that would substantially alter the above;
(3) total war is inevitable; and (4) the country that hits
first in the inevitable war enjoys a decisive advantage. It
is rather obvious that the nation seizing the initiative in
a situation such as this would stand an excellent chance of
either destroying an opponent's retaliatory capability or of
disorganizing it to such an extent that the residue could be
easily handled. The objectives are equally plain. The ini-














that it would be able to minimize the amount of damage that
it would receive while at the same time smashing the machin-
ery of the enemy's military organisation and breaking the
will of the target nation's people* This would then approxi-
mate the more classical meaning of military victory*
The basic premise in the argument for Preventive war
is the inevitability of total war* This attitude represents
one end of the "spectrum of possibility/* and a current atti-
tude popular among many falls at the other end of the scale
i
the impossibility of total war* Unfortunately, this latter
view is no more defensible than the first. Even if it could
be proven that total war is not inevitable or even likely to
occur, which it cannot, general war might still erupt*
Rational decision-makers could start a total war if they
believed that there existed an advantage in striking first,
and irrational decision-makers would need no justification
at all* But realistic analysis of the "strategic balance"
between the major nuclear powers reveals one pertinent point
that makes the possibility of nuclear war academic* That is
this i "nuclear stalemate" implies a degree of equilibrium,
not only in weapon delivery systems, but in weapon-alert
systems as well* In order for one power to launch effec-
tively a first-strike against the other it must try and
achieve maximum surprise in its pre-launch activities* This
would surely result in something less than a full operational
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launch* The resulting damage of this truncated blow would
not be of sufficient magnitude to eliminate a retaliatory
blow from the target nation* The conclusion that may be
drawn is clear* There could be no conclusive victory* The
absence of decisive victory in one important criteria for
"nuclear stalemate"} thus, the argument comes full circle*
Reviewing this strategy for its applicability, it
would superficially appear that the United States is mill*
tarlly best prepared for the kind of war most inconsistent
with its values, traditions, and policies r a surprise attack
against the Soviet Union | and yet, Preventive war is consid-
ered much too immoral for Americans to contemplate seri-
ously* Apart from this consideration, the military case
against Preventive war must be re-evaluated* First, there
is the condition of "nuclear stalemate*" The physical cir-
cumstances of this phenomenon significantly detracts from
the advantages of striking first* This was exposed in the
preceding paragraph* Secondly, it would be the height of
presumptuousness to 'artake such cataclysmic action as
preventive attack based on the thesis that total war is
inevitable* Although total war may not be impossible, it
certainly possesses a low degree of probability* In spite
of its fascinating characteristics, Preventive war would
appear to be too impractical, immoral, implausible, and
imbedlie.
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Multideterrence : ftultideterrer.ce has been advocated
for years by various experts, especially members of RAND
Corporation, a research center ironically subsidised by the
Mr Force* As was mentioned in Chapter I, Multideterrence
is the possession of a force so designed as to counter every
sort of threat an enemy night make* According to authorities
of the subject, the list of necessary, and minimum, pre-
14
requisites for effective Multideterrence is as follows
t
1* Nuclear weapons—nuclear weapons have to be em-
ployed in order to prevent an enemy, who also has such
weapons, from using them or threatening with them*
2* Limited war capability—conventional arms should
be extensive in quantity and diversified in purpose so that
minor provocations can be countered without resort to nu-
clear bombardment*
3* Net striking force—in essence, it is not the
sise of a nation* 8 nuclear or conventional stockpile that
counts, but the number of bombs, rockets, bullets, missiles,
or even rocks that can actually be dropped, fired, or thrown
upon enemy targets* In short, a nation can retaliate only
with the force that will survive after it has endured an
attack* An effective net striking force requires a wide
variety of weapons systems* The power of any single system,
1*1
. Etsloni, op * clt* , pp. 34-38*
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whether it is Polaris submarines, Minuteman missiles, or
B-70 jet bombers, could be neutralised by an enemy* In addi-
tion, hardening and mobility of launching sites is consid-
ered highly desirable under the terms of Multldeterrence*
Polaris submarines and carrier task forces possess mobility
and missile sites can be hardened, but just how one hardens
or provides mobility to 10,000-foot jet runways is an inter-
esting question.
4. Insurance against the unknown—it is proposed
that weapons systems not currently feasible—or called for—
be researched and developed* Production could occur when
t 5the need for these systems becomes evident,
5* Civil defense—civil defense could serve two
purposes* First, as suggested, deterrence can fail* Gen-
eral war may break out and a well-developed civil defense
would reduce the losses* Second, civil defense an be
viewed as a central element of deterrence itself* The in-
adequacy with which a population is protected is more likely
to offer a poor "credibility posture" to a potential ag-
gressor*
As illustrated by point number two of these pre-
requisites, Multldeterrence is more than a nuclear strategy*
15The reconciliation of this prerequisite with current
economic policies within the Department of Defense offers an
interesting case study in problem-solving*
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It is generally considered to have three fundamental themes;
viz., deterrence of aggression} freedom for the President to
select and apply the amount and kind of force appropriate to
the threat at hand; and third, the controlled use of force*
Rather than American defense being predicated upon the
"spasm" of Massive Retaliation (sometimes referred to as the
"knee-jerk*' response), present policies stress options,
flexibility, deliberation, and control* Multideterrence,
therefore, is the current strategy* It consists of nuclear
strategy, conventional strategy, and passive defense stra-
tegy* Officially, at least, it is a strategy of choice; a
strategy of flexible response*
What may be said in reviewing this section and its
theme of nuclear war strategics? The topics of deterrence
and military force have been discussed, and the post-war stra-
tegies of the United States were presented in a distilled and
somewhat descriptive manner* In summary:
1* It has been said that deterrence is the negative
aspect of political power where a premium is placed on dis-
suasion rather than coercion* Power, however, is an impor-
tant part of deterrence, for it takes power and its implied
utilisation to dissuade effectively* In addition, successful
Alain C. Enthoven, "U.S* Defense - Policy for the
1960's," speech delivered at Loyola University, Los Angeles,
February 10, 1963*
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deterrence requires a willingness to use power and a valid
evaluation of deterrent capabilities and intentions by the
party being deterred* The latter, along with various pre-
determined values , form the major inputs to the "cost-risk
equation* n Both parties involved with this equation should
strive for a minimization of cost and risk with a maximisa-
tion of gain* The planning of a deterred force should also
Include an appreciation for the economics involved in the
design and operation of that force* A successful deterrent
should involve "low cost-high gain" with regard to expendi-
tures and systems utilised*
2* Military force—the power of deterrence—has
three classical roles t a power and prestige index} a fun
tion of negotlationi and it serves as a persuader in war*
It was stated that the cohesive factor has traditionally been
the political objectives of the state* The nuclear environ-
ment, however, complicates the classical role of force*
Those responsible for strategy selection must consider the
wide range of "force-types" available and decide upon the
one, or combination of two or more, that will provide the
most appropriate response or posture to a given situation.
In addition, a democratic society requires that its atti-
tudes be Implemented whenever and wherever possible* These
attitudes spring from various sources within the American
public, but it is the unenviable task of the decision-makers
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to recognize an overall public attitude and then feed it
into the force-selection process* It was finally concluded
that military force is related to the decision-making proc-
ess and that this process involves the selection of various
kinds of force; i*e*, "force-types*" This procedure of
selection is the crux of strategy*
3* What about specific strategies? Those mentioned
were Containment , Massive Retaliation, Preventive war, and
Multideterrence
•
a* It was originally hoped that Containment would
check the spread of Communist influence and result in frus-
tration within the Soviet leadership* The defense of
liberty was added to this otherwise political and military
strategy, thus giving the entire policy an ideological
flavoring* But Containment proved to be paradoxical* Shot
through with ideological t cachments, the strategy ossified
into a brittle shell* The transformation into Massive
Retaliation occurred, coincidentally but not accidentally,
following the Korean war and with the ascension of John
Foster Dulles to the office of Secretary of State*
b* Massive Retaliation was considered more effi-
cient, more economical, and morally superior* It supposedly
marked the return to flexibility and was designed to allow the
united States to capitalise upon its great deterrent powers
the Hydrogen bomb and an assortment of lesser atomic weapons*
II
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Unfortunately, the Soviets selected Massive Retaliation's
natal year as the year to explode their first thermonuclear
device, and were soon on a par with the United States in the
sense that each could virtually annihilate the other*
c. The fascinating theory of Preventive war was
discussed, although it has never been an official defense
policy* The fundamental premise in the logic of Preventive
war is a belief in the inevitability of nuclear war* In
order to gain and maintain th& initiative in such a war, one
nuclear nation decides to attack its most likely enemy* It
was concluded, •••ever* that Preventive war in the environ-
ment of "nuclear stalemate " would produce indecisive victory,
if victory at all* Also, total war, although not impossible,
certainly possesses a low degree of probability*
d* Finally, the strategy of Kultldeterrence was
mentioned* This type of strategy places emphasis on the
capability of neutralizing threats of all descriptions and
includes nuclear power, conventional power, a "net striking
force," insurance against the unknown (research and develop-
ment), and strong civil defense* In essence, it xs a stra-
tegy of flexible response, and comes reasonably close to
providing the blueprint from which the current American
defense structure was built*
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CHAPTER III
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
Preceding emphasis has been directed toward the
development of nuclear war as a possibility of international
politics » and the strategics of this possibility* The in-
tended purpose has been to create a minimum foundation for
the eventual discussion of force and strategy within a new
international environment. The tactics utilized have brought
the study up to but not into this environment. The time for
penetration has now arrived* By completing the preliminary
framework—that is, the significant ideological, political,
and strategic factors contributing to the environment—the
mustering of forces for the attack will be accomplished*
The methodology of this particular chapter will con-
sist of a brief discussion of the cold war, which will omit
historical narrative and concentrate instead upon the funda-
mental characteristics of its post-war development* The
United States and Russia will then be treated individually
so that a better understanding of their significant motives
for seeking a different system of relations will be realized;
and finally, focus will be placed on the actual "arrival" of
the new environment*
World politics since 1945 have revolved primarily
around the conflict between the United States and its
•••
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assortment of allies and near-allies and the Soviet union
and its various "satellites." This confrontation has been
largely a continuation of the war that the Bolsheviks de-
clared on the non-Bolshevik world in 1917, but following the
termination of World War II, the conflict assumed added
intensity as a result of the increased power of the Soviet
Union. In the process, the Soviets transformed and assembled
eastern Europe into an economically and ideologically depend-
ent area. They also contributed to the Communist victory in
China in 1949 and, in turn, helped lay the basis for Commu-
nist infiltration from China into Southeast Asia. The
United States, immediately after the war, typically returned
her collective rifle to its honored place over the fireplace.
But she soon undertook a frantic rearmament program; formed
military alliances all over the world; and extended billions
of dollars for military and economic aid to countries that
leaders in the American government believed must be defended
from the expansive tendencies of Communism. Thus, the cold
war became a political conflict of the most intense sort.
It involved struggling between governments for objectives in
which the opposing sides employed various political, eco-
nomic, and psychological methods, but for the most part, did
not resort to large-scale military operations. This soon
became one of the cardinal rules of the game. In some
instances, the opponents engaged in non-conventional warfare
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and even made limited use of regular troops, but the rule of
"limited military hostility" was generally observed* Ac-
tually, this form of conflict was not especially unique;
often in history, countries vied with one another in the
pursuit of goals without resort to the utilization of armed
force* What characterized the political machinations of the
cold war was the scope of the arena, the stakes, the combina-
tion of instruments, and the way in which the instruments
were or were not used.
As the American reaction to the Soviet threat crys-
tallized, the strategic configuration of the political,
economic, and military forces in the world, in which there
were just two major centers of power: the United States and
the Soviet Union, evolved into a bipolar arrangement. Inter-
national relations from 1945 until about 1955 were to be
governed by the dynamics of this bipolarity. Books have
been written concerning the traits or dynamics of this phase
of the cold war; however, the following six characteristics
should provide an adequate illustration of the nature of the
cold war from 1945 until the first half of Elsenhower's
second administration.
1. universality . The term as used here describes
the goal of both the United States and the USSR: the expan-
sion of power and influence to every government and area of
the world. In actuality, this was an attempt to solidify
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the bipolar aspects of the conflict, a situation that both
major powers understood and were willing to pursue. Charles
Lerche refers to this objective of universality as the
"elimination of power vacuums , " where much of Southeast
Asia, China, Korea, Germany, and the Middla East served as
the principal battlegrounds* Both Washington and Moscow
enlisted aid in each of the contested areas and fought their
battle through these proxies. Perhaps the only notable
"losses" were China—to Communism—-and Tito's defection from
the Stalinist camp* Others like Greece and Iran, were saved
for the West* In essence, universality, or universalism in
the cold war context, was the attempted elimination of
neutrals*
2# Political ideology * Systems of beliefs held by
political groups are often adopted in order to justify
governmental or national behavior* By the same token,
governmental behavior patterns are occasionally molded after
the precepts of a given ideology* Many people have viewed
the cold war as solely an ideological conflict: Communism
versus Freedom—whatever that term may mean* Pure and
simple politics are either played down or discounted alto-
gether* It is true that the Soviet union possesses a highly-
developed ideology that is presented as the belief of the
Charles Lerche, Foreign Policy of the American People
(second edition; Englewood Cliffs: PrenTice-Hall, 1963),
p. 297.
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Russian people, and surely many of the fundamental tenets of
that ideology are considered inviolate by the Soviet leader-
ship} however, some of the secondary doctrines, such as the
need for violent revolution or the inevitability of war, can
and are manipulated and altered to serve political ends or
national interest. And yet the opponents of Communism con-
sider it to be a solid and psuedo-religious doctrine. By
contrast, the non-Communist world, or perhaps we should say
the non-Soviet world, possesses many diverse ideologies.
This diversity stems not only from the variety of the peoples
involved, but also from the unwillingness of the leaders in
the United States to compel adherence to any one system of
thought—unless it is one of anti-Communism. In any event,
this "ideological" cast has been an important characteristic
of the cold war. In this respect, at least, the USSR managed
a certain and somewhat dubious advantage over the West.
3. Interventlonism . Interventionism in international
politics consists of the efforts by the government of one
country to alter the attitudes of behavior of the government
in another country. The Soviet tools of intervention have
frequently, and quite often effectively, been utilized in
pursuit of "Soviet universality." The United States has
suffered numerous handicaps in such activities. For one,
American tradition operates against intervention into the
domestic politics of other countries, particularly countries
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in Europe* However, American intervention into the affairs
of Latin American nations has been rather consistent, both
in terms of frequency and in terms of limited success. But
were not the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine forms of
intervention. This question may be answered by the proposi-
tion that the United States did not require extensive altera-
tions in the domestic affairs of the recipient states, but
one wonders if intervention does not include influence over
foreign affairs, a fact in the operations of the United
States and one difficult to refute. The point remains that
the United States has practiced intervention in defense of
its cold war position.
4. Economic competition . Economic competition is
one of the oldest forms of non-military warfare. Usually,
economic competition has involved struggles for sources of
raw materials and commercial markets. Such activities have
been shaded occasionally by p tical overtones, but the
primary source of motivation traditionally has been the
power of the commercial dollar. Strangely enough, the
economic activities of the cold war have been dominated by
political considerations and have even been conducted at a
net monetary loss. But the Soviets and Americans have
relentlessly doled out grants, loans, and technical aid in
their attempt to win allies. This, it should be noted,
marked a drastic about-face for the USSR. Marxist theory
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holds that communist revolutions erupt as a result of worker
poverty. It would appear to be a case of Ideology being
altered to fit the political facts of life*
5* Transformation of diplomatic techniques * One of
the chief aims of diplomacy has historically been the settle-
ment of problems between governments by means of compromise,
and this function , as well as others of diplomacy , have
normally been conducted in a state of at least semi-secrecy—
that is until the cold war* This odd conflict, odd in many
ways, resulted in a form of public diplomacy where the vari-
ous media of public information possessed a vested interest
in the mechanics of negotiation as well as in its results*
The forum of the United Nations undoubtedly contributed to
this practice of "Wilsonian diplomacy. '• In addition, the
aims of diplomacy were changed* No longer was compromise
necessarily an objective j but rather heads of government,
utilizing the public nature of cold war diplomacy, used this
method to express the position of their government on a
particular issue* This was utilized by governments to garner
support from their own peoples as well as the support of
allies and possible allies* As a result, when leaders wished
actually to compromise, their publics, which had been intro-
duced to the issues in public debate, often expressed a
desire to remain inflexible* In the "land of diversified
ideologies," this can prove embarrassing* It cannot be
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maintained that the results are always disadvantageous, but
political leaders certainly encounter more difficulty in
conducting foreign policy, a fact manifested in the negotia-
tions for disarmament, German unification, and the status of
Berlin.
6. Agreement to disagree * Regardless of the issue
or issues involved, the rules of the cold war made it
axiomatic that united States and Soviet positions should be
diametrically opposed* Such opposition did not incorporate
any real hope by either party that it might persuade the
other, or win any victories; rather the agreement to dis-
2
agree was indicative of the totality of the early cold war*
What may be said then, in form of review, of the con-
duct and factors of the cold war up until about 1955?
Chronologically, the flow was something like this: follow-
ing World War II, a strengthened Soviet Union commenced to
expand its influence* The United States hastily began rearm-
ing and responded to the Soviet strategy with the strategic
posture of Containment* The Truman Doctrine was applied in
Greece, and Containment was given an ideological cloak* The
Marshall Plan in Europe soon followed, and the revival of
the continent was commenced* The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was formed as a military alliance, German
2Lerche , loc. cit*
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recovery and rearmament was witnessed, and Europe was well
on her way to some type of integration* In the interim, the
Russians exploded their own atomic device, and there was
evidence to indicate that the Soviets were shifting their
attention to the Par East* China fell into the hands of Mao
Tse-tung, and the Korean war was fought to an Inconclusive
termination* As a result of this "police action," doubts
were cast upon the American strategy of Containment, and was
accompanied by a new administration in the White House*
John Foster Dulles and the strategy of Massive Retaliation
came to the fore, but the Indochinese War and the explosion
of Russia* s first thermonuclear device made Massive Retalia-
tion appear weakest in the very thing it was supposed to do
beet—deter. The entire pattern of events from 1945-1947
until 1954-1955 was marked by certain characteristics*
First, the cold war was a political and ideological war*
The two super-powers, by means of political and Ideological
arguments, economic competit and open intervention
attempted to eliminate all power vacuums in the world*
There were to be no neutrals* Either a government was for
the freedom of mankind or he was against it* There was a
clearly understood agreement between the United States
and the Soviet Union as to what constituted the proper rules
of the game* What one was for, the other was against* This
was total bipolar ity. Diplomacy became an open discussion
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governmental positions on controversial issues. The United
States relied upon its nuclear monopoly of warheads and
delivery vehicles; it injected ideological connotations into
its political, economic, and military policies; and anyone
not on our side, ipso facto , was an opponent of liberty and
Justice.
But by 1955, the complexion of the environment was
changing. Bipolarity was beginning to break down. Europe
was resurgent, China was bellicose and fervent, nationalism
and neutralism was on the rise with almost uncontrollable
force, and both the United States and the Soviet Union began
to realize that their nuclear power was slowly losing
utility in the evolving environment. They were capable of
destroying each other, but ironically could not. Others
realized this. The old rules of the cold war were no longer
applicable.
Basic changes have occurred in history before. One
hundred years of devastating war—as total as possible at
that time—taught both Catholics and Protestants in Europe
that neither could beat the other. Christianity and Islam
have co-existed, fitfully, as two missionary faiths each
claiming to be universal. Yet finally, each had to realize
the inconvenient fact that neither could destroy the other.
In 1955, perhaps the same compulsion existed. It certainly
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having too much, "Destructive equality" had arrived. It
was perhaps appreciated that diplomacy would have to remain
flexible; mutual relations would have to remain fluid so that
the irresistible force would not meet the immovable object.
At this point, the study will treat the Soviet Union
and the United States separately in order to better under-
stand the roots of the new environment—an environment of
required flexibility; an environment of nuclear irrelevance
and political importance. There appears to be more than
just equality of arms responsible for this condition*
Soviet Union
A basic contention of this study is that the Soviet
Union welcomes a new environment in the conduct of inter-
national relations. The reasons for this welcoming were
born of necessity. Without laboring the point, let it be
repeated that one of the two fundamental explanations for
Soviet desires for a new form of relations was nuclear
parity with the United States. By 1955, the Soviet govern-
ment had possession of thermonuclear weapons and had de-
veloped a sufficient number of delivery techniques to con-
vince the United States of a credible capability in case of
nuclear war. But perhaps equally important is the argument
of practical politics—or if you wish, national interest.
The foundation of this argument will now be examined in more
tilMK<
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detail. It involves the fragmentation of the world Commu-
nist movement.
The "communist bloc" that welcomed Mao Tse-tung's
Chinese People's Republic into their fold on October 1, 1949,
was not as solid and homogeneous as many would believe.
Stresses and strains were present, the majority of which
were attributable to differences in historical and national
backgrounds, pre-revolutionary social and economic develop-
ment, elementary geography, and conflicting ambitions. Into
this environment came a government led by a group of men
sincerely inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideas, who, for twenty
years, had been fighting for their lives, territory, and
control. They owed their victory to strength, ruthlessness,
and resolution. There was no reason to believe that the
addition of Red China would accomplish more than to attenuate
the stresses and strains already at work.
From this time until after the death of Stalin in
1953, relations between the Soviet union and the Chinese
government were occasionally uneasy but never difficult.
Both countries were concerned primarily with the economic
recovery necessitated by World War II and with consolidation
of their respective gains. Following the enigmatic demise
of Stalin, and during the power struggle that resulted within
the Kremlin walls, it was imperative that the Communist world
reflect a monolithic appearance. But pressure was mounting
ft*










within China, and after Khrushchev* s successful clamber to
the top of the Soviet pile in 1955*1956, the first thrusts
of confrontation began to take definite form.
Professed authorities on Sino-Soviet affairs speculate
and differ as to the exact time and place of active disagree-
ment between Moscow and Peking. They all seem to agree,
however, that it was Khrushchevian policies promulgated upon
his ascension to power that provided the proper stimulus.
It is reasoned that any man with less authority than Stalin
who attempted to control the Soviet giant as did Stalin
himself would have fought a hopeless political battle. Con-
trol would go to the man who promised much and gave little.
That man was Nikita Khrushchev. And this is really the crux
of this discussion, which in turn hopefully provides under-
standing as to why the Soviet Union desires changes in the
conduct of world politics. Khrushchev is a practical
politician. He is concerned above all with making things
work in such a way as to conserve his own power and further
the glory of Mother Russia, and less concerned with ultimate
aims or militant Leninism. Perhaps the first real blow at
the Chinese, and the first real indication of the beginning
of the new environment, occurred in early 1956. The occasion
of February, 1956, was the 20tb Party Congress of the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The most spectacular
aspect of this meeting was Soviet denunciation of Joseph
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Stalin, but something else occurred at the Congress even
more important in the long run than the attack on Stalin.
Khrushchev proclaimed two radical amendments to the
Leninist canon:
1. A negative interpretation of the inevitability
of war*
2. A negative interpretation of the necessity for
violent revolution*
Edward Crankshaw writes that the logic of these pronounce-
ments is quite clear when analyzed from the standpoint of
Khrushchev as a practical politician* Nuclear war could
cripple or destroy the Soviet Union j therefore, it would be
foolish to continue the advocacy of inevitable war* The
fostering of revolution through violent means could lead to
local war, which could easily develop into a major nuclear
conflagration; therefore, other means must be developed for
extending Communist influence* Although differences with
Communist China may have provided Russia with the excuse for
denouncing two basic elements of Communist ideology, the fact
remains that she did-—which illustrates what was said earlier
with regard to molding or altering an Ideology to fit politi-
cal or nationalistic objectives* In any event, by 1955-1956,
3Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow vs * Pekin
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 81*
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we can assume that the Soviet Union was willing to explore
4
new methods of conducting the cold wax.
To attribute Russian desires for some type of detente
with the West almost solely to the polemics of Communist
politics, as the emphasis of the last few paragraphs would
seem to indicate, would be an exercise in absurdity. This
was undoubtedly among the major if not the most important
factor; however, other considerations must be mentioned for
the sake of balanced perspective.
The curious European renaissance of power surely
played its part. Not only was the political power of Western
Europe on the rise by 1955, but European industry and wealth
were also ascending. In addition, West Germany was admitted
into the councils of NATO in 1954. The fact remains obvious,
however, that despite these various developments they all
presented more of a danger to Russian political or national
interest than they did to the ideological concept of
Communism.
United States
As mentioned, the steady accretion of Russian atomic
and hydrogen weapons, accompanied by demonstrated progress
4Hereafter, the Soviet Union shall be referred to as
Russia, indicating this author's belief that national in-
terest is the predominant motivating factor in Russian
conduct.
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in the development of delivery systems, brought about a
global "balance of terror." In 1945, the United States was
the undisputed, and the undlsputable, leader of the free
world* By the mid-fifties this leadership may have been
still undisputed, but it was no longer undlsputable • Whereas
the "balance of terror may well have been accidentally co-
incident with the Khrushchevian realization of Russian
national interests, the same balance brought home to Ameri-
cans the perils of their historic and dichotomous interpre-
tation of war and peace; of force and diplomacy* The
fundamental problem of the united States had become one of
professed strategic posture* The United States had become
increasingly fearful of employing its military power in
answer to Communist challenges*
As long as its military power was concentrated in
readiness to the call of Massive Retaliation, the dilemma
confronting the free world coalition led by the United
States was twofold: it could seek to meet localized aggres-
sion where it occurred on the basis of almost certain mili-
tary inferiority; or it could bring its overwhelming
strategic air and missile power into play—and rightfully
expect full retaliation* Diplomatically, these two alterna-
tives reduced themselves to settling for a negotiated peace,
like the status quo ante beHum in Korea, or of a disadvan-
tageous settlement as in Indochina* Or, by relying upon
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nuclear devastation, diplomatic negotiation would become
academic. Both alternatives presented serious drawbacks*
The United States, therefore, was presented with the equally
unpalatable options of localised "appeasement" or worldwide
holocaust*
For almost ten years, the United States held either
an atomic monopoly or a far superior capacity to deliver its
atomic and hydrogen bombs* As we have seen, the Russians
did not explode their first atomic device until 1949, and
their long-range air capability was not fully developed
until after the Indochina crisis of 1954* But the United
States could not utilize her superior strategic power to in-
fluence the world political situation* She could not even
deter the Russians from constant probing actions* And yet,
the reliance upon atomic superiority and the renounced use
of force except in retaliation against direct attack was the
ado ted American position* The "balance of terror" left the
United States with no alternative but to seek a new opera-
tional and conceptual environment for international rela-
tions* Atomic monopoly was no longer a valid criterion for
strategic planning, and yet a type of paralysis gripped the
American conceptual apparatus* John Spanier has said that
it was "characteristic of Americans in the early 1950 *s
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Into space, the Ford Motor Company produced the new Edsel
5
automobile."
Regardless of the world situation in general, the
significant forces at work within the internal structures of
the two super-powers would have eventually influenced their
external behavior. The resulting arena of world politics
would have probably differed very little from what exists
today. But American and Russian internal forces were not
solely responsible for the new environment} and whether or
not the current situation would have developed without these
pressures is, in the final analysis, a moot point. The
relevant consideration is that other dynamics were operative
by 1955, and contributed to—if not acce lerated—-the develop-
ment of the contemporary state of world politics. These
factors were "new nationalism" and the attendant phenomenon
of neutralism. This awakening of the vast continents of
Africa and Asia truly helped to revolutionize international
affairs *nd countered all post-war tendencies toward bi-
polarism.
After 1955 old empires, subjected to unprecedented
pressures, began to crumble. In a somewhat orderly transi-
tion, with the exception of Indochina, the regions of South
and Southeast Asia achieved self-determination. By the
5John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since tior\<i
War II (New York* Praeger, 1961), pp. 206-207.
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outbreak of the Korean War, over six hundred million people
achieved dubious independence* The aftermath, unfortunately,
was not as orderly as the transition* Unleashed emotions
threatened to tear down all imperial vestiges* People were
convinced that their backwardness and grinding poverty re-
sulted from mis-rule by former colonial administrators* The
"revolution of rising expectations" was under way*
In a world of unprecedented political and ideological
conflict, Asian and African nationalism was neither left nor
right in its orientation* What the new nations required was
time and opportunity to establish viable political and eco-
nomic organizations* In retrospect, it appears that oppor-
tunity was more available than time* Sophisticated national
leaders quickly discovered that the United Nations provided
an excellent forum in which to express desires—the expres-
sion of which soon became disproportionate to ,ower and
responsibility* In addition, it was soon realized that the
cold war provided an opportunity to play one major power
against the other, which became, for many, a game of "non-
alignment."
For the new nations of Africa and Asia, the great
problem of the early fifties was to sustain their struggle
for equality without becoming committed to the cold war*
Always seeking political or ideological advantage, the
United States and Russia invariably intervened in every
r.
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upheaval* Self-determination was usually the loser. Ameri-
can efforts to preserve the status quo , along with Russia*
s
encouragement of revisionism, resulted in a wide variety of
Involvements for both parties. The United States persisted
in defining the cold war on moral and global terras, com-
pletely underestimating revolutionary fervor or confusing it
w_ch Ideological inclinations detrimental to God, liberty,
and mass production. America could not seem to understand
that the emerging nations had interests and ambitions quite
separate from those of the United States and Russia. It
was, in fact, the arrival of this "third force" that spelled
the end for the bipolar concept and marked the beginning of
the new environment* This new context was not only charac-
terized by nuclear stalemate between the atomic Goliaths,
but was also Identified by the proliferation of many
political Davids*
The new environment was thus conceived by the prac-
tical politics of Russia and the strategic implausibillty of
the United States* Its birth was induced by the forces of
nationalism and non-alignment* It was not only marked by
"destructive equality," but provided for what Charles
Lerche calls the "renaissance of flexibility*" In conclu-
sion, a brief look at Professor Lerche* s evaluation of this
Lerche, op * cit • , p* 307*
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The super-powers themselves recognized the extent to
which they had lost their once-exclusive ability to
control world politics* Partly because of the in-
creasing determination of other states to make their
own way | and partly because of the serious inhibitions
military stalemate imposed on national policies, the
Soviet and the United States toned down both the
intensity and the dimensions of the cold war* Their
relative positions did not appreciably change, and
the Issues between them remained as numerous and as
difficult as ever; both realized, however* that un-
complicated total opposition has no outcome but
futility, and both became aware that other issues
demanding solution could no longer be ignored*
'
The death of bipolarity indeed marked a fundamental
change in the scheme of things* The real importance, how-
ever, seems to lie in the fact that bipolarity cannot be
reimposed* There would appear to be no technical, psycho-
logical, or political method for attaining it again* It is
truly a new environment—not a passing event* It is a new
environment in which many myths, traditions, and policies
(often one in the same) must be re-evaluated* The former
lines of demarcation outlining the arena of the cold war no
longer exist* The cold war context of pre-1955 is no longer
relevant, although it has been observed to one degree or
another in the last eight years • ' New direction and purpose
must stem from recognition of this new environment*
Nuclear war and its strategics, naturally including
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the early phases of the cold war* What are the roles of
force and strategy in the new environment that has been dis-
cussed? That investigation will be the objective of the
next two succeeding chapters • Before continuing, let us
briefly recapitulate the substance of this segment of the
study.
1* An extremely brief resume of the cold war was
intended to reveal two points* One concerned the nature of
the conflict} it was—and to a lesser extent perhaps still
is—-a political confrontation. The second objective con-
cerned the resulting influence on international relations;
from the end of World War II until the middle of the 1950 »s
the cold war produced a bipolar arrangement in the world
structure*
2* The characteristics, or dynamics, of this bipolar
struggle were reduced into six principal categories:
a. Universality—the goal of both great powers
was the expansion of influence into every possible govern-
ment and area of the globe* This was referred to as the
e liii '.nation of power vacuums and solidification of the
bipolar concept*
**• Political ideology—the expansive tendencies
of the Russians were cloaked in their professed ideology of
Communism, which perhaps is not as inflexible as many would











a diversity of beliefs* A basic tenet of the cold war was
that the battle was fought in the name of idee ogy. Little
or no attention was overtly paid to national interest or to
the political objectives involved.
c. J entlonlsro—thls consisted of the ef-
forts taken by both powers in their attempts to alter the
behavioral attitudes of governments both in and outside of
the bipolar structure*
d# Economic competition—another tool utilized
by Russia and the United States in their struggle to win
friends and influence people was the disbursement of finan-
cial aid* Although a new undertaking for Russia, the ex-
tending of loans, grants, and assistance was made to all who,
at any given time, were considered targets of the 'ideologi-
cal" battle*
e* Transformation of diplomacy—the traditional
techniques of diplomatic relations and compromise were
drastically altered into a forum of open debate in order to
advance or publicise the governmental positions of the coun-
tries involved*
f • Agreement to disagree—it became axiomatic
that United States and Russian positions should be diverse
on all issues* If fate or interest resulted In congruent
positions by both countries, it was difficult to separate
embarrassment from frustration*
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3* The breakdown of bipolarity can be traced to the
period of 1955-1956 • The study treated the two super-powers
Individually; Russia's prime motivations for seeking a new
form of relationship *-emraing from practical politics
Khrushchev, as well as Russian nationalism; the United States
motivations consisted of strategic imposition and the con-
tinued pursuit of questionable policies. At this point let
it be said that it seems ironic that the United states
ignored the principle of self-determination in Asia and
Africa, where it might have enjoyed an element of success,
and promoted it behind the Iron Curtain where it had vir-
tually no chance of success. But too often, Americans have
behaved as if Communism were the host rather than the par
Q
site of change* In any event, the rise of nationally and
accompanying neutralism that commenced in the pos -war years
and began effectively to manifest itself in the 1955-1956
period exerted a tremendous influence on the overall conduct
of international relations* The United Nations became a
forum for the emerging nations, and a gradual but undeniable
shift in the locus of power occurred within the councils of
the organization* This only illustrates the extent to which
the two major powers found themselves in the paradoxical
position of possessing the deadliest weapons presently known
Norman Graebner , Cold Wax Diplomacy i 1945-1960
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to man, and yet being no longer capable of completely domi-
nating the affairs of the world* The destruction of their
bipolar concept was sealed* The new environment of inter-
national relations had arrived.
Until then, a country could achieve its desires by
means of military force if diplomacy had failed. But the
advances in science and technology as well as the advent of
"third force* politics has altered tkls situation. It is
doubtful if victory could be won in nuclear war. National
suicide appears much more likely* And yet we must still
examine international relations in the light of force and
strategy* Neither human nature nor the basic nation-state
system have changed appreciably since the days of Clause its,
Conventional conflict is not only likely, but highly proba-
ble. The fact that nuclear weapons developed at a moment
when two states were overwhelmingly more powerful than
others only tended to reduce the nation-state system to a
precarious "balance of terror" and potential destruction*
"It Is one of the mockeries of the modern age that peace
itself seems to rest upon the mutual fear inspired by the
g
magnitude of nuclear destructiveness*"
9David S* McLellan et al. , The Theory and Practice of
International Relations (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,""
iwo), P * 141 *




FORCE AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
A review of the step-by-step development of this
study should serve to clarify the purpose and contribution
t
of this particular segment* An important assumption has
been made, and hopefully proven in the foregoing chapter,
that the dynamics of international relations in operation at
the present time is different in comparison to those that
developed in the early years following World War II* Prior
to the initiation of these new factors, the dominating trait
in the consideration of national security was the reliance
upon nuclear strategics as an answer to the distinct possi-
bility of nuclear war* Military force was primarily designed
to fulfill a vital nettd within this nuclear setting, and
strategic planning was conducted in relation to the adopted
forces* But nuclear war is questionable within the present
*
international environment* What effect, if any, does this
have on the utility of force and strategy?
This chapter will take up 'the first half of this
question* Development will consist of another brief look at
force and 'the likelihood of all-out war,' the relativity of
force, the features of military power in the 1960's, and a
quick investigation of America *s traditional interpretation
of power*
i turnup
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Total war is unique in its nature* Because of this,
the standard relationship between war and territorial power
and sovereignty has been drastically altered. The new rela-
tionship enables belligerents to by-pass the traditional
concepts of national defense* The "old days." or the pre-
nuclear days, were a period of international stratification.
There were categories of great powers, near-great powers,
lesser powers, and a whole assemblage of weaker governments
•
Each government knew its place and the place of others. The
accepted symbols of division included military force. But
the advent of atomic and hydrogen weapons has produced an
impasse among the powers possessing these weapons. Their
nuclear tools are still awe inspiring and sources of con-
tinual fascination, but they do not have the day-to-day
practicality of the spear, cross-bow, or automatic rifle.
The weaker nations, inflamed by the ideology of anti-
colonialism and no longer willing to accept their positions
in the international pecking order, have taken advantage of
the stalemate. Their voice can be heard, and more often
than not, they have an attentive audience. It would lead
one to believe that perhaps traditional military force has
become irrelevant in modern international society. In what
way?
The destructlveness of modern weapons has deprived
victory in total war of its traditional meaning. Although
TV







military victory in war is certainly an important pre-
condition, it should not necessarily be the only objective*
Another vital goal should be the construction of conditions
more congenial than those in existence prior to the war* It
is doubtful whether victory in a nuclear blizzard of bombs
and missiles could provide for a new and better world order*
There is evidence that the super-powers realize this by
their increased devotion to the alternatives of nuclear wars
competitive co-existence and limited or localized wars*
Many even believe that because of the unpalatability of
nuclear "hangover, ft the consideration of all-out war has
become irrelevant along with military force* Their reason-
ing grants that a certain chronic tension exists in the world
environment where one power seeks to upset the status quo
and another is equally determined to prevent this from hap-
pening* They pin their hopes, however, on the belief that
the ruinous results of overt conflict is so obvious to the
parties concerned that nuclear war will be avoided at all
possible cost* The emerging nations must surely realize
this strange modality; so not only is mankind perhaps faced
with the demise of general war, but perhaps it is also
witnessing a magnified re-enactment of the collapse of the
"feudal system.**
Opinion expressed by Or* Charles Lerche, delivered
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It would be unfortunate if unbridled optimism were
injected into the assumption that "if total war has become
irrelevant it has therefore become impossible*" This con-
clusion would make the dangerous supposition that men always
behave rationally and that pathological behavior patterns
will never again occur in the conduct of international rela-
tions* Aside from this unlikelihood, there are several
other solid reasons for the valid presumption that total war
and the use of nuclear military force is possible* In the
first place, one side or the other may miscalculate the
likely effects of an aggressive action* Secondly, a war may
break out not because of miscalculation arrived at by delib-
eration, but simply by accident* Thirdly, one side or the
other may achieve a genuine technological breakthrough in
weapons, delivery systems, or defensive capabilities* Such
possibilities could dramatically shift the precarious stra-
tegic balance and make war appear as a rational policy*
Fourthly, the spread of nuclear weapon availability could
conceivably present an insoluble control problem* And lastly,
localized conflicts could expand in area and scope until
they embraced the major powers to a degree that would make
the use of nuclear weapons an only alternative* There is,
unfortunately, no assurance that resort to total war as a






r .. ..- . * S. r : . • .• ....
• ?.*- XZ ri
80
technique of International politics has forever ended* The
relationship between war and sovereignty nay have been al-
tered, but man can be counted upon to seek and discover new
methods of expressing his will, and for seeking and dis-
covering new techniques for the building of new orders more
to his liking* Clausewits, Schlieffen, Mahan, and even
Douglas MacArthur, will still be studied and their strategies
and tactics will be used in trying to mold a force applicable
to our times* It will be a frustrating and tortuous exercise
for those that are still convinced that the rules of old are
still valid* What these have failed to understand is that
the situation is now different*
During the Korean War, General Douglas MacArthur,
perhaps the last of the military classicists, stated in his
testimony before Congress that "the minute you reach the
killing stage, politics has failed, and the military takes
2
over." It would appear that he was wrong* He was refer-
ring to circumstances that simply do not exist* As it has
been said before, military force as a technique of action
has undergone a transformation* In another era, the United
States would have moved in and overthrown Fidel Castro* She
2U*S* Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations , Hearings . Military Situation in
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would not have been restrained by an over-developed sense of
virtue in the non-utilization of adequate military power at
the Bay of Pigs* But political restraints imposed limita-
tions* In all gradations of combat, force has become and
will continue to be subjected to more political restraints*
There is a fundamental reason for this* In the new environ-
ment, war is no longer defined by capabilities* "Restraint
is essential and a selection of means must be made* This is
a political decision which is properly the responsibility of
3the political leaders—not the generals
*
H Samuel Huntington
has argued that military officers should approach policy
issues concerning the proper constitution of force from a
purely professional military viewpoint* This has not always
been true in the past; it is not always true now, although
the professional military officer of today has a much broader
grasp of the political issues involved in world affairs* In
any event, "military policy is always the product of poli-
tics* Good military policy is only the product of brave
4
choice and ingenious compromise by experienced personnel."
This is especially true in 1964*
The basis of this change in the nature of force lies
3Carl H. Asms, "The Changing Nature of Power, " United
States Naval Institute Proceedings . March, 1963, p* 28.
4Samuel P* Huntington, The Common Defense (New York!
Columbia University Press, 1961), p. xii.""
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within the character of the new international system* It is
not the case of a simple shift of power within a traditional
if not sacred system* The salient characteristic of the new
system is no longer the confrontation of two dominant world
powers* It is the enormous increase in the number of par-
ticipants and the surprising amount of political power that
they wield. Force based on sheer nuclear pow< c, therefore,
has assumed questionable relevance. Though military force is
perhaps the most fundamental element in a nation *s overall
strength, it is certainly not the only element, nor is it the
most effective in the day-to-day execution of foreign policy*
The adhesive that holds the Western alliance system together
against the so-called "Communist bloc" is not necessarily
the overwhelming military force of the United States, but
rather the belief in a common threat, geographical proximity,
5*
ideological affinity, and a sense of common purpose*
There are limits to the usefulness of military force*
It cannot always be used to compel other nations to accept
American aid; it cannot always be used to coerce other na-
tions to accept American positions; it cannot always be used
to prevent wide-spread acceptance of Communist ideology* In
5
l
It is interesting to observe the effects of the cur-
rent 3ino-3oviet divergence on the Western alliance system*
The degree to which the system remains cohesive will surely
be dependent upon the interpretation of its members regarding
the continued presence and intensity of the "common threat*"
;.''•':-





other words, force Is not always relevant to certain kinds
of foreign policy situations. Recalling the early defini-
tion of force as the power to protect national interests,
then it is obvious that the attempted utilization of force
may, in fact, result in lessened rather than in increased
protection of national interests through loss of prestige
and failure to comprehend the proper application of other
forms of persuasion* Although force may not always be
relevant, it is always relative*
Force is relative with respect to time. This fact is
highlighted by the distinction between "potential force" and
"force-in-being." The great power of the United States is
reflected as much if not more in its potential than in its
physical presence. Force is also relative to the problem
toward which it is directed. Force must always be consid-
ered part of a larger national capability to achieve certain
objectives. America's capability to defend her shores is
quite different from dealing with Communist influence in
Africa, raising living standards in Iran, or settling Greco-
Turkish disputes. Success in foreign affairs certainly
relies upon the skill with which force is applied; but
The conceptual framework pertaining to "force rela-
tivity" is direct"' ~ontrlbutable to* Cecil V. Crabb, American
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perhaps more importantly, success in foreign affairs requires
skill in recognizing varied problems and applying the proper
type of force to that problem.
Force is relative in at least two additional aspects*
One is the relativity of the force with regard to various
nations* The ability of the United States to affect the
course of international relations requires value judgments
concerning comparative capabilities. This is the heart of
nuclear stalemate. At one point in history, this country
was not required to consider seriously the comparative power
of others; it possessed a nuclear monopoly. But the steady
accretion in Russian nuclear and missile technology has
brought the importance of relative capabilities into sharp
focus. Although more difficult to measure, non-military
force is equally important. What is the relative capability
of the United Stat s and India to persuade Asian masses to
pursue a given policy? How much relative force does the
United States possess in attempting to gain acceptance of
its policy positions within NATO In International politics
there is force and counterforce; American push and Russian
or Chinese pull. In order to estimate the effectiveness of
a nation's force, it is necessary to identify all th i fac-
tors in a given international situation*
Lastly, force is relative to the country by which it
is applied. As Cecil Crabb has said:
•ijg* u^-i.i « f ;j-i;v.; ». MBMtfl : V., I g|-jMMl
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Merely possessing power, along with even greater poten-
tial power, is no guarantee that a nation will exert
strong influence in world affairs. Totalitarian re-
gimes are often free to use all the powers at their
command for diplomatic ends. Democratic nations, how-
ever, usually limit, sometimes severely, the ends for
which certain kinds of power may be utilized .7
This analysis could be altered to include "totalitarian
regimes" as well as democratic nations in the limitations
placed upon power in seeking diplomatic ends* This is cer-
tainly the case in the new environment* The politically
usable forms of force have been altered. Force is still
effective; only its make-up has changed. If the nature of
force no longer permits its use as an effective means of
achieving national objectives, then the form of force must
be outmoded. The United States would do well to continue
relying upon a nuclear strategy to deter a nuclear war, but
it should not delude itself into believing that this type of
8
strategy would be vccessful in actually fighting a war.
The changing nature of force is only being gradually under-
stood and accepted. Both the United States and Russia
maintain that peace is the state objective of each country
and stress the deterrent role of their military forces. But
this still leaves each side frustrated in efforts to find
politically usable forms of power to restrain or alter the
will of the other.
7 8Crabb, loc . clt . Amme, op . cit
• , p. 28.
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In attempting to answer the question of what cones
first, force or strategy, one is faced with an impossible
task. They obviously cannot be distinctly separated. The
problem, therefore, of attempting to set forth the proper
role of force within the oft-mentioned new environment is
equally difficult without the aid of certain strategic
guideposts. The whole picture will be hopefully completed
in Chapter V; however, certain characteristics of the "new
force" can be presented. These features constitute what is
believed to be the nature of military force in the mid-
1960»s.
One extremely important point must be reiterated.
Military force is a. political tool . It is something that is
used to retain or achieve national objectives as determined
by national interests. Military force as an Isolated entity
is meaningless. It must have purpose and that purpose should
rightfully be dlstillated from the politics of national
interest. Military doctrine and political doctrine, there-
fore, are intrinsically intertwined. What, then, are the
considerations of force with regard to this fact?
First, while in certain cases war has become less
useful as an instrument of policy, it cannot be disregarded.
Even total war—completely outmoded as a means t? achieve
or retain polit 1 goals—remains a "possibility." Th
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mentioned previously. General war forces oust, therefore,
be maintained in a constant state of readiness* Security is
not the gift of nature, or a God-given right, or even a
starting point in policy formulation* It has become the
product of effort-—the end result of policy* It has become
the dominant goal of foreign policy, with foreign policy
Itself often defined as a branch of national security
q
policy* The environment in hich this policy is born can-
not be overlooked; and although that environment may be one
of nuclear stalemate, it is still nuclear* Security is not
absolute* It is a value Judgment and each sovereignty must
determine the measures and means for safeguarding its sur-
vival* This will, and should, include nuclear weapons.
Force should also have conventional characteristics.
This would allow additional flexibility in diplomacy and
would enable the po~lessor to negotiate confidently for the
control of nuclear arms* However, balance of force is essen-
tial* Conventional forces should not be considered a
substitute for a nuclear war capability but as a complement
to it* Against an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons,
it would be suicidal to rely entirely or preponderantly upon
conventional force* Potential aggressors must understand
o
Huntington, op * clt.. p. 426.
"ibid.




• £ 8 . •»#*
tea aoi tfUMi tma to^MMMi Mtil mia—J<i
tlCtettft
-
:oo od iofl blown aeo*o* {AtfOliiV
tntt*wlq*c~ a ft* ft** ^Jtecas **w i&alou
r>*qqlvp± fawuoriqo am :-cnJ
.
mthat the United States is In a position to match any incre-
ment of force, nuclear or conventional with that which he
might possess or be inclined to utilize* This would reduce
the incentive to engage in some form of aggression and pro-
vides the best opportunity for limiting or eliminating
hostilities*
In addition, as certain forms of force become even
more irrelevant as techniques for action in the achievement
of political objectives, governmental leaders will have to
recognise fully and accept the role of military power in the
field of insurgency and counter-insurgency* This requires
the closest possible coordination between political, economic
and psychological efforts* To interpret "unconventional
warfare" only in military terms invites miserable and costly
failure* Once again, clear-cut military victory in the
classical sense it virtually impossible in such cases. It
is not a case of pursuing a "no win" policy; it is a case of
accepting the realities of a different environment * A
desirable political and psychological setting must be es-
tablished as part of the campaign and in light of existing
geographic and economic conditions* It is generally accepted
that we are past the point where men live in cave* and throw
rocks at their < es* The nuclear age requires a modicum
of sophistication.
Fourthly, the changing nature of force will continue
,
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to result in more and more detailed political control over
the utilization of that force. A long-standing tradition in
the United States has been the unshakable belief in a clear-
cut dichotomy between war and peace* A sign of maturity is
the slow dissolvement of this shibboleth* Policy-makers,
and to a lesser extent the general public, are realizing that
the devastating power of our military force requires more
selection and control over it use* The current nature of
international relations will require continued collaboration
between military and civilian officials*
Lastly, the nature of force should be such that it
promotes confidence within the gener I public and serves to
bind the support of the public to the decisions of the
policy-making elites* This requires acceptance of the new
environment by the general public* This, in turn, requires
an examination of basic attitudes by the American people*
This examination should consist of an inward look at the
possibilities of peace, attitudes toward Russia, and atti-
tudes toward the cold war* Peace need not be impractical
and war need not be inevitable* Americans should not be
blind to differences that exist between the United States
and Russia, but we should not be blind to common interests
and the means by which differences can be resolved* And
Americans should remember that we must deal with the world
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of the last twenty years been different* The cold war has
changed In its nature* Force must be non-provocative, care-
fully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selec-
tive use*
It seems appropriate, while discussing the American
public, to discuss briefly another aspect of force, which is
indirectly associated with military force in the prevailing
international situation* However, it is related rather
closely with the topic of the preceding paragraph; that is,
the acceptance by the American public of the realities of
world politics and the use of force in the 1960 , s* The
major problem that most Americans seem unable to solve in-
volves the means of meeting their ends—as opposed to the
ends themselves* Not only do Americans lose their sense of
balance between ends and means, but there is a tendency to
disregard the true nature and limitations of force, particu-
larly with relation to matters beyond the immediate control
of the national government* There are three basic reasons
for this tendency: (1) an extraordinarily successful
history; (2) unbounded faith in law and legislation; and (3)
equal faith in technique and material factors* The result
has been a failure to recognize the vicissitudes of power
and the cincture that this places around the organs of
foreign policy planning and execution*
John p. Kennedy, Commencement Address, The American
University, Washington, D* C«, June 10, 1963*
04
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An expansion of these three basic reasons would in-
clude the favorable geographic circumstances of the United
States which, in turn, includes its natural resources and
climatic conditions* Being so richly endowed, the United
States has not been forced to rely very heavily upon the
compromise of interests and its ramifications of foreign
policy* Also, a certain "old world-new world" dichotomy has
left the citizens of the United States with an ingrained
suspicion of traditional diplomacy* A manifestation of this
fear was detectable in Woodrow Wilson *s desire for "open
diplomacy" following World War I. But perhaps the most
significant explanation—-which appears to be a composite of
all—is a historical wish for perfection* Foreign policy
and, consequently, national security policy, conceived in
terms of principles and based on faith was believed to be
the only method of overcoming the evils of power politics*
Foreign policy so designed was guaranteed to capture the
appeal of public opinion) foreign policy designed to express
a compromise of interests was guaranteed to result in sus-
picion. The typical American approach to foreign relations
has thus been littered with stereotyped prejudices, sacred
cows, wishful conceptions, and fixed emotionalism* The
fundamental weakness is a failure to recognize and admit
that rivalry and strife among states, communities, and
factions are the normal condition of mankind*
..."
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The point in mentioning this opinion is to illustrate
the difficulty that accompanies a basic shift in Asierica*s
international behavior* There is still a belief that the
United States can influence all events in world politics;
there is the persistent belief that if just enough atlence,
or just enough money, or if just enough force is applied, or
if we just talk long enough and loud enough, then Democracy
and the United States of American will triumph* It is not
at all surprising that large segments of American public
opinion consider elements of the new environment, with
regard to accommodation with Rus .ia, as "appeasement*" No
nation in history has placed so much emphasis upon "prin-
ciple** in dealing with other countries as the United States*
"No compromise with principle" is a perennial cry* During
the 1950's for example, a major obstacle to high-level diplo-
matic conferences among the great powers was widespread
belief within the American population that such conferences
inherently favored the "enemy*" A form of undeviating oppo-
sition arose to any form of conduct at these conferences
that did not adhere to a preconceived idea of what the ail-
American position should be* Certain groups within American
society have come dangerously close to equating the very
process of diplomacy itself with "appeasement" and "abandon-
ment of principle. :! These highly-vocal groups have placed











12diplomacy* Such extremist views, views which consider
Moderation no virtue, can easily smash the delicate stra-
tegic balance that exists and remove all doubt concerning
the inevitability of nuclear war*
How effective or worthwhile was this engage**-..^ of
"force utility" as a dynamic of current Internationa.- rela-
tions? As suggested, perhaps the whole fabric will appear
after "strategic utility" has been discussed; for it is
through strategy that the elements of force are reflected in
form of policy or posture* Nevertheless, force was investi-
gated, and the effort was direct d at the following points:
1* The relationship between war and force has been
one of the time-honored sacraments that have been altered by
the new situational factors of world politics* The practi-
cality of nuclear weapons was questioned as tools of effec-
tive foreign policy, particularly with relation to the
problems presented by the proliferation of new political
entitles
•
2* It was reiterated that, despite the degree of im-
probability involved, nuclear war can still occur through
miscalculation or irrational policy selections by
12Synonyms for appeasement listed by Webster - to
pacify, quiet, calm, sooth, allay - suggest that the idea i
basic to human relationships and that there is nothing in-
trinsically immorai. about the concept* Unfortunately, the
term is invariably equated with the kind of sell-out epito-
mised at Munich in 1938*
V ,sk«.:v 4*lM*«f)afr flow*.
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governmental leaders* However, the classic meaning of vic-
tory In war appears to have been a casualty of the nuclear
age*
3* Another by-product of this evolution In inter-
national relations has been the changed nature of force
itself* Now, as never before, political restraints are part
and parcel of the force structure*
4* Although military force may no longer be relevant
to all situations that arise in the conduct of foreign af-
fairs, it is now constantly relative* This relativeness is
manifested in four ways:
a* It is relative with regard to time; i.e.,
potential force in relation to "force-in-being."
b* It is relative to the problem to which it is
directed
•
c* It is relative also to comparative capabili-
ties of various nations*
d* Lastly, It is relative to the nation wishing
to apply its force* This firmly illustrates the limitations
that are placed upon the utilisation of all kinds of force*
5* The five most obvious features of force in the
1960's were then presented and discussed* These consisted
of i
a* The continued necessity of nuclear weapons*
b* The requirement of conventional force*
-oc' s*«tfT »fc*a8iratlb boa berfOMaiq mute •«•* • »©«:
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c. The budding need for Insurgency end counter-
insurgency force*
d* The absolute requirement for continued politi-
cal restraint la the utilisation of military force*
e* The need for support and understanding by the
general public*
6* The last topic for investigation, or better yet,
expression of opinion, concerned the traditional American
misunderstanding of power and its proper uses in interna-
tional relations* The purpose was to demonstrate the diffi-
culty, but necessity, for "re-educating" the American public
to the terms and cc editions of the new environment* This
environment marks the "renaissance of diplomacy," and yet
the American people are still stumbling around in the diplo-
matic "Kiddle Ages," attempting to understand and truly
appreciate the standard role th t diplomacy plays in the
conduct of world affairs*
Mjmmm*lwm van *A& \» •oat*lb£od has uui ex*.-
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CHAPTER V
STRATEGY IN THE NEW ENVIRONMENT
Early in the study, a specialized definition was
gi --en of strategy where it was said that stratec , both an
art and a science, has become a method of selecting the
military weapons and forces necessary to secure or retain
the objectives of the state, with objectives themselves
determining or influencing the choice* This may be ex-
pressed by equating military systems with military force;
strategy then becomes the policy position that determines
how the force will be utilized* This is a classical rela-
tionship that has endured throughout history* The question
is now raised regarding the implications of this relation-
ship in the age of thermonuclear weapons and hopeful accom-
modation. The primary purpose of this chapter is to
investigate this problem; secondarily, it should provide a
more defined picture of the Mforce-strategy dynamic •"
The analysis will consist of a discussion on national
and military objectives with a re—emphasis of the proper
role of military force in the determination of national
political or,Is. In addition, uncertainties that plague
strategy sanction will be mentioned; the capabilities and
limitations that influence, or should influence, strategy
planning will receive attention; and finally, strategic
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needs of the United States will be suggested and a specific
need for national purpose will be stressed*
It Is necessary to keep clear the distinction between
political and military objectives. Although they are not
separate , they are definitely different* Sovereignties do
. •% wage war for war*s sake, but rather in the pursuit of a
political policy* The military objectives established
within various theaters of operations, or on specific battle-
fields, are merely means to a political end* Therefore, the
military objective should be governed by the political ob-
jective and subject to the basic condition that policy does
not demand what is militarily impossible* This is uniquely
important in the i uclear age* Adaptations must be made in
national objectives to include consideration of the practi-
cal limitations that are placed upon strength, capabilities,
and political situations. It is within the context of these
various situational factors t tat the objectives of the
nation must be determined* If national security is consid-
ered one of the most important objectives of the state then
it is a simple exercise In deduction to realise that the
utilization of force (i.e., strategy) must be conducted with
keen appreciation for the political limitations involved*
The mere possession of force does not guarantee its success-
ful use In world politics* The United states and Russia
both have harnessed tremendous sources of power, but neither
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can be assured that the other or a third party will be duly
influenced in its international behavior so as to insure the
protection of basic interests of either of the great powers.
As was mentioned previously, force is a relative factor.
This applies to its nature as well as its use.
Assuming that national security is the foremost goal
of American foreign policy, then it must be realised that
the strategics of national security must have foundations
that are embedded in realistic politics. This truth pre-
vails in the new environment just as it has for generations
past. American national interests have been endangered
before—long before Communism arose as a powerful world
force. It seems ironic that the reaction should be so un-
certain and emotional. Although Americans are uncomfortable
discussing international relations in the language of "power
politics," they are very accustomed to discussing the
"reality" of power in their daily lives. They devote con-
siderable time and effort in "winning friends and influencing
people," trying to obtain promotions, trying to pass or de-
feat various pieces of legislation. These are all efforts
to exercise power. Yet, there is the nagging belief that
power in foreign affairs can be eliminated or should be
eliminated. It is generally believed that if the United
States possesses the largest and most impressive military
force in the world, then everyone will concede to American
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desires and the necessity for compromise, diplomacy, and
negotiation becomes much less important*
It should be obvious, therefore , that the initial
requirements for analyzing strategy in the new environment
is acceptance of the premise that force is a tool of poli-
tics; and that the method in which this force is utilized
constitutes strategy; and the selection of a strategy must
consider the situational factors that are at work within the
political structure of international relations* It must be
realized that a concept for international relations should
not be limited to negative goals, wishful thinking, or
defensive reactions* International relations, and strategy
selection, is analogous to international politics and should
be approached with a positive understanding of power rela-
tionships; power with purpose* The objectives of a nation
should be a workable and tolerable balance of those relation-
ships •
Within this intellectual structure of international
politics and national objectives, the process of strategic
planning should give recognition to the inevitable presence
of variables, uncertainties, national capabilities, and over-
all limitations* As this country comes to grips with the
new environment, it is faced with a complex and difficult
problem: it must evolve long-range plans for greater
strategic flexibility in the face of these numerous
>ili
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uncertainties and capabilities* These problems must be
identified and placed in perspective before a reasonably
successful solution can be derived* Only by taking a long-
term view of both American national values and purposes can
the first step be taken* First , the uncertainties!
1* Technological change * The lead time required to
recognize applications of new technologies and then to in-
corporate them into an operational weapon is very lengthy,
perhaps five to ten years at least* Future technologies
will surely render some new weapons now in development ob-
solescent before they become fully deployable*
2* Intelligence * Much of strategic planning is
based on estimates of enemy capabilities—present and future*
This is an extremely hazardous operation, particularly when
one considers that current estimates are, at best, derived
with the help of something less than a perfect science; and
it is only possible to project into the future from an esti-
mate of the present*
3* General planning problems * This is a broad cate-
gory that includes all of the accepted difficulties that
arise within a democratic society that is heavily bound by
bureaucratic lines of authority and communication* The
problems of general planning also include an elusive "x"
factor* Once a weapons system is selected in support of a
specific element of strategy, will it meet predicted sche-
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4. Political stability * The united States nay seek
stabilization to general war through a mutual deterrent , but
it is very hard to stabilize the politics of a fermenting
world—-as in Africa, Asia, the Middle £ast, and Latin
America*
5 * yhq strategic balance—of-terror * This delicate
balance may shift at anytime* If one side or the other ex-
ploits new advances in defense technology, the other side*s
ballistlc-raisslle force may become obsolete* This change in
balance could certainly influence strategic thinking* In
addition, the balance could easily be affected by the
political stability of the remainder of the world, or by
drastic shifts within the internal political structures of
either the United States or Russia* The careful prevention
of any pressures that might possibly tip the balance is
closely associated with the values and objectives of the
giants seated on this deadly seesaw*
6* Values * This "uncertainty** requires careful ex-
pansion* Both the United States and Russia are faced with
the old moral problem concerning the relationship between
power and values* Each side must seek and discover fresh
answers to this relationship in light of their almost
unlimited acquisition of sheer power* The thermonuclear
weapon is not just another explosive* Missiles are not just
"different" weapons* Together they represent a quantum jump
av ml








in the power to destroy the most basic values known to man-
kind—-people , wealth} culture, and history itself. The
danger of unilateral annihilation is real; the danger of
mutual annihilation is equally real* Each side has a
responsibility of attempting to prevent this tragedy that
could occur either by accident or by some crazed nihilist
who rejects all values* Another point should be mentioned
as well: can anyone predict with certainty the level of
damage that Russians are willing to sustain under all pos-
sible future political conditions? We might assume that a
high-tension international situation could cause Russian
leaders to estimate that all-out thermonuclear war is the
least undesirable option available to them*
Although long-term planning can be hampered by uncer-
tain variables, there are a few tangible "constants" that
should be considered* It may be said that these represent
2American capabilities* Before briefly examining these,
however, three important points should be mentioned with
regard to general capability* These were touched upon
earlier in a different context, but their relevancy appears
Walter F* Hahn and John C* Neff (eds*), American
Strategy for the Nuclear Age ( New York i Doubleday, 1966)
,
p. 174.
2An excellent analysis of American capabilities
appears in Chapter 9 of Dr. Charles Lerche's Foreign Policy








especially applicable at this juncture. First, a nation's
capability is highly relative to other nations and to their
objectives. No nation is "capable" in a vacuum or without
purpose* Secondly, capability, like its corollary of na-
tional security, is a dynamic phenomenon whose elements are
constantly in a state of flux* Thirdly, time has a major
impact upon capability* Capabilities must not only be
predicated upon current military and political situations,
but must also be formulated in regard to trends and future
possibilities* Keeping these three criteria in mind, the
following may be stated:
American capabilities would include favorable geo-
graphic conditions with due regard to such items as physical
location, internal waterways and other modes of transporta-
tion, and climatological conditions* Also included among
these capabilities would be the favorable demographic pat-
tern within American society} that is, population density,
median age, manpower pool, general population trends, and
the political, economic, and social structure of the United
States* Consideration would have to be given additionally
to natural resources, industrial and agricultural production,
military power and potential, the educational and technical
level of competence within our society, and national morale*
Dr* Charles Lerche considers national morale to be the
capacity of a nation to perform efficiently under prolonged












stress, thereby serving as an index of the degree to which
people follow their leaders through the labyrinth of foreign
policy. 3
In the final analysis, review of capabilities, limi-
tations, and uncertainties, as well as that of the nature of
nuclear war itself, reveals two specific items to bear in
mind in strategy development. First, military force is a
means of obtaining national objectives* There would appear
to be nothing inherently good in military force or in mili-
tary operations, and their functional purpose is measurable
only to the extent that they contribute to the objectives of
the state. These, in turn, must be determined by the exi-
gencies of the international political and military environ-
ment and the relevancy or applicability of various fori i of
force—be they political or military* Second, like other
tools and techniques, military force covers a wide spectrum
of possible us ft« The organization, training, research,
personnel policies, and weapons systems must envisage the
various types of missions which are likely to develop*
Looking ridiculous would be the least of our worries if we
based our military plans and strategy on the assumption of a
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Decisions made on the basis of all the various fac-
tors mentioned are not simple to make, but their difficulty
is no excuse for avoiding judgments or postponing choices.
The alternatives have to be realized in light of political
and technological realities and based as closely as possible
upon a valid interpretation of national values and objec-
tives. This may appear truistic, but as Bernard Brodie is
careful to point out, strategic planning can result in
errors between the acceptance of an idea in principle and
the implementation of it through appropriately selected
4plans and actions. A problem of the united States is that
in thinking about war :nd peace it does so within an intel-
lectual and emotional framework largely molded in the musty
past. Images, slogans, ideas, and attitudes relating to the
subject of war are filtered through a historical experience
of war back when it was a limited-liability operation.
Errors in value judgments can easily be made under such cir-
cumstances, in any event, the people of this country have
made a remarkably unanimous and largely covert decision
against preventive war. This is without doubt a valid deci-
sion that meets with no serious objection, but the conditions
of the nuclear age have made this decision, be it an error
4Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age ( Prince-
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or not, extremely important* It is one of the facts of life
that is absolutely basic to strategic planning; for in
giving up the "solution" of preventive war, the American
people have accepted a situation that binds them to a stra-
tegy of deterrence* Three vital strategic considerations
must be made as a result of this situation* First of all.
we must strive to maintain the current balance between
Russian and American nuclear forces and, if possible, extend
the American position out of the backwater of parity and
into a position of undisputed superiority* Secondly, the
United states has to maintain a real and substantial capa-
bility for coping with limited and local aggression* This
is to avoid finding ourselves in the frustrating position of
being unable to stem such aggression without resort to the
kind of force which may be totally inappropriate and which
may critically increase the risk of nuclear war* The third
strategic principle to consider is that the danger of total
war, although improbable, is nevertheless within the realm
of possibility* Military postures and diplomatic negotia-
tions must be maintained and conducted with this unnerving
fact in mind*
Preventive war, Massive Retaliation, and even the
Counterforce concept enunciated as recently as 1962-1963, by
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, are hopefully semantic
milestones along the road to a U*s» strategy that provides
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for the necessary flexibility demanded by the new environ-
ment* This environment, one of military stalemate and
political flux, is by no means insured* At the lower end of
the "conflict spectrum" lies Cuba and South Vietnam, both of
which suggest the wisdom of maintaining and strengthening
the American capability for conventional response—for
making the traditional American punishment fit the crime*
Yet any of these hot-spots carry the inherent danger of
escalating into an exercise of Russian and/or American nu-
clear muscle* Certainly a strategy of flexible response
with a choice of options in both target objectives and
methods of delivery is a sound concept.
It is felt that the mention of an additional factor
in the strategic fabric is imperative* It is surely the
most decisive limitation in American strategy formulation*
Force and strategy are virtually meaningless unless focused
by national purpose and a sense of direction* Equally
important to the clarification of national purpose, and
actually a part of the whole, is the absolute necessity for
abandoning a set of empty abstractions that have served as
poor substitutes for real purpose* Charles Lerche presents
this plea incisively in his book Foreign Policy of the
American People i
(The terms) security, peace, good faith, trust, and
all their countless elaborations have—despite their
intrinsic desirability—in fact been used as pretexts
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for a refusal to come to grips with real problems in
concrete contexts* Considering the nature of the
cold war and the insolubility of the problems it
spawned , the formulation of American objectives in
abstract terms usually did little harm and occasion-
ally considerable good* But the issues of the future
will not respond to either temporizing or evasion
|
if the united States is not to be left hopelessly
behind events. Americans must develop notions of pur-
pose that are adequate to the concrete conditions.*
Zt has been said that strategy development must be con-
ducted utilising the guidelines of political reality , flex-
ible response, and meaningful national purpose* To aid in
providing a more complete picture, something should be said
with regard to a chosen strategy's contribution to the
necessity for stability in international relations* This is
based upon the important assumption that stability in the
world environment is in the best interests of the United
States* In essence, the selection of a particular strategy
or amalgamation of different strategies, depends on a sub-
jective feeling which a nation tries to create in an
opponent's mind* This feeling should be compounded of
respect and fear, but should not be such that it transmits
evidence of aggressive intent* The effective operation of a
strategy over the long term requires that the opponent be
willing to live with his enemy's possession of the capa-
bility upon which the strategy rests* Another of the
Lerche. op * cit*» p* 466* Much of the conceptual
theory supporting this entire study is indirectly attributable
to the lectures and writings of Or* Lerche*
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military classicists, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan 9 observed
that "force is never more operative than when it is known to
exist but is not brandished ." This would appear to be a
critical ingredient of the new environment* The function of
force shaped into strategy is the credibility of that force,
and the feasibility of utilisation in the event that the
delicate environmental balance is destroyed* The feasibility
of that force can only be created on the basis of "usable"
power and a practical appreciation of the political re-
straints at work within the environment* Historic principles
of power in politics hold unchanged even though completely
new strategies may be devised* Power and strategy must
B&rve a political goal; military action must be subordinate
to political aims* Strategy must not be solely dictated by
technology! strategy in the new environment should not be
developed by extending the strategies of the past*
In conclusion, our weapons, strategy, and even tac-
tics, must be considered and adopted without the trial of
war—despite the blessings of technology* We must choose
and then accept the risks* We have to be prepared at any
moment to go with what we have on the shelf* Thus, in a
world susceptible to military and political unstability,
strategic plans must be under constant review* This must be
tempered by such factors as national policy, enemy capabili-
ties and intentions, our own capabilities, technological
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developments, and economic allocations* We must, conse-
quently, rely upon guidelines rather than dogmas, and the
overall posture must be both credible and feasible. It is
obvious that the United States requires strategic delivery
forces that are able to absorb a surprise attack if it should
come and still deal a crushing return blow* In addition, we
require both active and passive defensive measures* We can
assume that potential aggressors are rational, but we should
plan on irrationality and/or miscalculation* We also have
to be prepared to meet limited aggression* The forces to
accomplish this should be predicated upon consideration of
the probable extent and nature of limited war* Our interest
should not only be the avoidance of nuclear war, but the
localisation or deterrence of these lesser conflicts* In
connection with this, the forces of the United States should
be designed and trained to cope with the insidious nature of
non-conventional warfare* This type of conflict is the
perfect manifestation of the political and psychologic 1
potentialities of modern warfare*
In less complicated days, even as recently as fifteen
years ago, the strategy of deterrence was fairly simple and
involved little more than Teddy Roosevelt's dictum of "walk
softly and carry a big stick* " Those days are irretrievably
gone* The big stick has grown monsterously large, and yet
it must be handled with the finesse of a scalpel* Strategy
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and deterrence have become a matter of reciprocity, and the
premium is now on diversification and diplomacy* It is not
realistic to think that real or imagined enemies will
obediently roll over and play dead because ftf a bombastic
threat or loud proclamations of righteousness. The military
force involved must be able to survive and penetrate* The
force—-in whatever form it takes—must be able to leave here
and get there* It must be flexible enough to meet all pos-
sible contingencies* Before any of this can be done with
anything approaching guaranteed success, there must be at
least two fundamental adjustments made in the basic philoso-
phy of the United States* First, foreign policy—as well as
national security policy—should be made to serve a national
purpose} this purpose, or national interest, must be clearly
understood within the framework of realistic world politics*
Second, there must be an understanding that power is a
valuable tool with the capacity to achieve intended results
by affecting the actions of others
,
provided it is utiliz d
with practicality, realism, and purpose* Neither of these
adjustments will provide black and white answers to all
situations, nor will they provide the united States with a
magic formula* Such required re-evaluation will surely be
accompanied by a degree of pain and discomfort, but the task
should be undertaken. Perhaps a few bloated moral beliefs




but fresh reassurance and re-defined purpose makes the
effort worthwhile. Above all else, there must exist a "will
to utilize" force if and when necessary and in a realistic
manner* This appears to be our best defense in avoiding
international imposition, and even worse, the indescribable
carnage of a possible nuclear war*
A broad range of topics has been recognized in this
section of the study, and it may initially appear that depth
has been sacrificed for scope. It is optimistically believed,
however, that closer reading will reveal a deep thrust at
two of the key themes of the study: the imperativeness of
realistic, political purpose in strategy development, and
the attendant subordination of pure military objectives. In
general, the unabashed presentation of these beliefs and the
remaining discourse on strategy in the new environment may
be abr Idged as follows
:
1. Distinction was drawn at the outset between
political objectives and military objectives. War is not
waged for the enjoyment of battle or to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of weapons; war is fought in the pursuit of politi-
cal policies. These policies should be derived so that the
goals of any required military support are realistic and
obtainable . This in y demeans the possession of a sub-
stantial force—quite the contrary. Possession of a credible
and feasible military force provides for effectiveness in














the execution of foreign policy Inside the arena of Inter-
nationalism. The recognition of the applicability of "power
politics" must be accomplished. Military force Is, there-
fore, required, but the strategics of realistic politics
should determine the manner In which that force Is utilized*
2. The variables, or uncertainties, of strategic
planning were enumerated and consisted of technological
change, intelligence gathering and evaluation, overall
planning problems, political stability throughout the world,
the finely-drawn strategic balance between the United States
and Russia, and the relationship between power and values.
3. In addition, certain constants were mentioned in
relation to n 4 onal capabilities. These were approached
from the standpoint of tha United States and Included geo-
graphic factors, demographic considerations, and the
economic power and potential of this country.
4. It was suggested that the current posture of the
United States has been the result of a denial of preventive
war as a "solution"—leaving a firm commitment to the
strategy of deterrence. The necessity of this position is
quite clear when thought is given to the dangers of the
nuclear age. However, nuclear deterrence alone does not
provide for adequate response to other forms of conflict;
thus, the growth of "flexible response" has occurred as an
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answer to localised and conventional warfare as well as to
non-conventional conflict.
5. The theme of "purpose*' was reiterated once more.
The suggestion was made that regardless of what political
policy is adopted or what form military support might take,
it is all irrelevant unless directed by national purpose and
objective. Abstractions cannot sarv as substitutes for
goals. The world environment must be recognized for what it
is and appropriate objectives formulated. These objectives
may have to be limited in order to correspond with situa-
tional factors, but each step taken should provide founda-
tion for additional progress.
6. The importance of maintaining the present stra-
tegic balance was stressed. This appears most critical. It
is necessary to maintain a credible force, but it should not
be such that it transmits aggressive intent to our enemies.
7. Finally, two fundamental adjustments in the
philosophy of the united States were offered. These included,
once again, the truistic requirement that strategy should
serve some realistic national purpose. In addition, power
was presented as a valuable tool provided it is utilized
with practicality and realism.
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In the beginning, it was stated that the primary con-
siderations of the study would entail investigation of
nuclear war's influence on international relations and the
roles of force and strategy within the resulting environment,
A digest of the major points discussed in the development of
this effort should reveal the results of the investigation*
Atomic science has produced weapons of war that
extend the dimensions of man's destructive capability beyond
comprehension* The result, however, has been paradoxical*
As knowledge and skill produced more and deadlier tools of
war, and as these devices became operational in the hands of
the two post-war powers, the will to utilize this power
within the traditional context of military force became
flaccid* But the specter of possibility remains, and the
rules of possible nuclear warfare have their own macabre and
remorseless logic: (1) the first blow in a nuclear war must
be the last if classical victory is to be achieved; (2) the
aggressor must thus possess an overwhelming superiority of
force; (3) this required superiority is virtually unat-
tainable according to current evaluation; (4) retaliation
is thereby a distinct threat and there is every reason to
believe that it would achieve crippling success* The mutual
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strategy of deterrence has been the inevitable conclusion*
Not only is a deterrent capability mandatory in the age of
possible nuclear war, but the possession of a credible re*
tallatory force is a vital ingredient in the maintenance of
nuclear stability* Further irony is found in the fact that
it is this same stability that has contributed to the new
environment.
As suggested, nuclear stalemate is not the only fac-
tor in the changed complexion of international relations.
Political pressures, and notably the rising influence of
nee—nationalism, have influenced foreign affairs and national
security* These have had their effect on force* Military
victory in a nuclear war is now questionable, and the very
nature of force and its applicability in the conduct of
relations has been altered* There is still a relationship
between force and national aim; force is still required in
order to attain objectives, but it is no longer the acquisi-
tion and operational efficacy of sheer military might that
is of crucial importance* Reliance upon pure military force
can now work to the disadvantage of a state in the pursuit
of its goals* Military power is still one consideration,
but it has lost its relevance in the nuclear age as an
effective means of protecting national interests* Military
force must be accompanied by a resurgence of understanding
with regard to the realities of usable power, which include
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politlcal v economic, psychological, and diplomatic forces
"total force*1 guided by realistic goals
•
In order to form this relationship, there must he
clearly-defined national objectives that are reasonable and
capable of attainment within the framework of the new
environment* Military objectives must become secondary to
political objectives* This is not to say that unadulterated
military force has become secondary} the proper role of this
force must be correctly understood as a valuable and neces-
sary tool—but only in the support of the primary political
objectives of the nation-state* This requires a balance of
military strength so that it may be called upon to serve a
variety of purposes as dictated by the needs and requirements
of the government*
The proper approach, therefore, requires nuclear
stability, re-defined national purpose, diversification of
military force, realisation of the proper role and feasible
uses of that force, and a refined appreciation for the capa-
bilities and possible achievements of diplomacy* The posture
should be diplomatic and motivated by meaningful political
goals, supported by a diverse military force, and conducted
with an understanding of what can be accomplished within the
new environment with usable forms of power*
There is undoubtedly much more that can be said about
force, strategy, and their proper relationship to
VII
fen* «JtfNM*#& ^6 *«fW **v±*r*»{do laftoJ
w$* 8»ffa> *• :*U0»a—** iff* ft*****
b«tj*tfl "saio* X*d«x* M
eJW* ft* «*Xa** **qo*q ©
<8llX0V S *A fc
x*;>*fll< ml-** *-
i
Iran piii atiad «mC •»*©% vxc
m






'ni«if^ fens 4Y9»£*3ift ,«Braol
123
of American omnipotence. Americans can no longer treat all
countries alike—be they enemies they are trying to dissuade
or allies they are trying to control* There are adversaries
that cannot be swept aside and there are allies that cannot
be dictated* Loud talk and wishful thinking no longer will
suffice*
What are the roles of force and strategy in the new
environment? Force must be existent* Force is existent,
but it is imperative that it be flexible, consist of some-
thing more than armed might , and be subject to immediate
support of a more total effort* strategy must be formulated
in response to realistic purpose and obtainable objectives*
The united States must sharpen its understanding of how the
spectrum of conflict operates in today's world* The United
States must i: cognize that this spectrum includes the strug-
gle produced by economic, political, and technological
progress* These dynamic forces should be made to work for
accomplishment and may be substituted for the more recog-
nizable and orthodox means of warfare* The first task of
trm^ government, if it is to survive, is to master this
intellectual challenge* The entire pattern of force and its
utilization within a strategic framework must be re-evaluated*
Infatuation with purely legal distinctions and solutions, the
artificial dichotomy between war and peace, and an almost
mystical faith in American infallibility must all give way
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to realistic appraisal and comprehension of the whole prob-
lem* It is only through such comprehension that America
will be able effectively to create strategies and implement
force structures that will fulfill the purposes of the coun-
try* It is only on such a basis that the United States will
be able to achieve maximum advantage from its many resources*
Many traditions may have to fall by the wayside, but ele-
ments of the trac r tional American character will continue to
serve well: the traits of ingenuity , intelligence, and
inspiration* To these we must add patience and flexibility*
The time is now*
•rf* so
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international relations* The list of subjects or topics is
infinite. Various omissions have been purposely made, and
include such fascinating things as Global Strategic Concepts,
economic Potential for War, Psychological Considerations in
Total War, the Idea of Mutual Invulnerability, and such
specific aspects of strategy as Ail-Out Counterforce Retalia-
tion and Limited Counter-City Retaliation As A Bargaining
Tactic. But the objective has not been to try and say
everything about the subject—only something* Touching all
aspects would require more knowledge and audaciousness than
exhibited here* The expectation is that perhaps some of the
more important considerations have been presented* A person's
own interests, requirements, and curiosity will have to
supply what is missing* To conclude, it is believed that an
offering of personal conclusions, based on the reading,
research, and contemplation done in preparation of this
essay, is expected* They will be compassionately brief*
*« Th* presence of a new environment la real * Con-
ditions in the world of 1964 are different than they were in
1945* The advances in nuclear technology and their attendant
effects upon the nature of nuclear milit ary power have been
discussed previously in varying lengths, but the world en-
vironment is different in other ways* A revolution has taken
place in the former colonial and less-developed areas of
Africa and Asia* Many new nations have won their independer.ee;
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both the number of now nations and the rate in which they
have sprung up are vastly different than what was antici-
pated* Political reaction to these amazing events is suf-
fering from a conceptual lag* These nations have acquired a
special importance in world affairs for a number of reasons
s
strategic location , large and growing populations, resources,
and above all, the magnitude of their own problems, to which
the rest of the world cannot remain indifferent* This is a
political and economic problem—one that cannot readily be
influenced by military force* These changes that have
occurred in the international order require new techniques
in problem-solving* The accelerated pace of change has upset
traditions, created new demands, encouraged revolutionary
ferment* It affects what nations want and what they can and
cannot do* Governments of today must deal with complex
situations requiring political and economic finesse* Suc-
cess will go to those who exhibit knowledge and appreciation
for the delicate use of relevant forms of force* Nuclear
power is no longer relevant, other than in helping to main-
tain a strategic balance* Nuclear force v ithin the new
environment is only "usable" as a deterrent force—and as
Glenn Synder has said—deterrence is the negative application
of power* What is thus needed is a means of expressing
positive applications of power*
2* The nature of the new environment is political *
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The cold war has been a political confrontation* The new
environment does not necessarily mean that the cold war is
over, but it should provide realisation to those who still
doubt that political struggle requires political strategy*
Old and comfortable concepts will not suffice in this battle.
The very nature of the "third force*1 is political* Russia
desires a new format for relations because of politics and
national interest* The United States can no longer afford
to labor under the false misconception that it is waging a
battle against the devil and that nuclear strength and God
will see it through* The commitment to the strategy of
deterrence is necessary—-if for no other reason than to main-
tain the balance that was so important in the establishment
of this framework of international politics* But continued
expansion of "flexible response" is needed in order to pro-
vide adequate and proper support for the political objec-
tives of the nation* There cannot be sole reliance upon a
negative form of power* Force, and certainly strategy, are
still requisites, but complete emphasis and total reliance
upon nuclear strength constitutes continued denial of "new
realities" and is another step down the lonesome road of
"old myths*" The many-faceted aspects of a political con-
flict demand equal diversification in its military support*
3* Policy and power have definite limitations * It
must be realized that foreign policy and the extended use of
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power have definite limitation*. The United states should
not strive for the impossible fulfillment of a perfect or
Utopian policy , but work toward acceptance of the fact that
it cannot control all of the factors that are at play in
international politics* The United States should not lose
its sense of balance between ends and means, and should not
disregard the true nature and limitations of power*
4 * Military objectives must be
,
attuned to political
objectives * The most basic requirement of national security
is the capability and willingness to make decisions; deci-
sions with respect to objectives being sought and the poli-
cies or courses of action to achieve them* The validity of
objectives depends upon the probable success of policy
choices in the face of opposition* This entails suitability*
feasibility t and acceptability* When the validity of an
objective has been established, the policy choice is made
and the risk accepted* The key issue in this Hstragegy
selection" process is the clear delineation of objectives*
The selection of these political goals should then govern
military posture and action*
5* There is a need for public x ^-orientation . Once
again, tradition%1 military victory is virtually impossible
in any nuclear war, and it is even doubtful in a conventional
war unless political objectives and national purpose are
clearly understood* Because of a gap between the American
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public end responsible decision-makers , this will require
massive public re-education, specifically concerning the
substance and nature of the environment, the effective uses
of relevant force, and an appreciation for traditional
diplomacy* The American body-politic has been subjected for
almost twenty years to a steady diet of "crusades, 1* moral
superiority, and the magical powers of the "American way."
But it is only through re-evaluation, fresh purpose, diplo-
macy, strategic balance and diversification, and a realisa-
tion of the realities and relevance of force that peace can
be achieved, order maintained, and stability preserved*
Generally speaking, the current American policy is to co-
exist peaceably with professed enemies while at the same
time attempting to work slowly and warily for additional
accommodations that will decrease even further the tensions
that exist* This policy appears prudent and moderate, and
shows signs of the realism that must prevail* The basis of
this policy, of course, is the fact that we are in the
nuclear age* While the United States enjoys a certain
nuclear superiority, it does not have absolute nuclear su-
premacy* This 1« the military equation which makes prudence
and moderation indispensable, which makes victory by uncon-
ditional surrender an irrational and impossible American
objective* Americans can no longer suffer the disillusionment
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